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I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 27, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“the Commission”) voted to provide publicly traded companies with 
interpretive guidance on the disclosure of climate risk within the 
existing requirements under federal securities law.1  The announce-
ment followed years of letters and petitions sent to the Commission by 
environmental and investor advocates which described interpretative 
guidance about climate risk as material information that must be 
made available to protect corporate securities investors and to inform 
market participants of a company’s potential liabilities.2 
 
 1. See Press Release, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC Issues 
Interpretive Guidance on Disclosure Related to Business or Legal Developments 
Regarding Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2010/2010-15.htm.  As of the date of submission of this article, 
interpretive guidance had been announced, but not released. 
 2. See, e.g., Supplemental Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk 
Disclosure, No. 4-547 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
petitions/2009/petn4-547-supp.pdf [hereinafter Ceres supplement II] (asking 
Commission to provide interpretive guidance concerning climate risk disclosure in 
annual filing of corporations under Regulation S-K Items 101, 103 and 303); Petition 
for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, No. 4-547 (Sept. 18, 2007), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf [hereinafter 
Ceres Petition]; Evan Lehmann, Regulation: SEC Turnaround Sparks Sudden Look at 
Climate Risk Disclosure, E & E PUBLISHING, LLC, July 13, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/
public/climatewire/2009/07/13/1; Letter from Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. et al., 
2
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Yet this article proposes that the Commission’s work is only half-
finished.  To date, there has been little discussion about climate risk 
disclosure for municipal utilities and tax-exempt rural electric 
cooperatives (“Publicly Owned Utilities” or “POUs”) that own and 
operate power facilities including coal-fired-power plants.3  POUs 
utilize the municipal bond market to finance fossil fuel generation 
projects that significantly contribute to greenhouse gas emissions.4  
Operations generating large amounts of carbon are likely to suffer the 
greatest fiscal, litigation, and regulatory impacts arising from carbon 
mitigation efforts.5  However, POUs are currently exempt from the 
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (“the Securi-
ties Act” or “the ‘33 Act”) and the periodic filing requirements of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act” or “the ‘34 
Act”).6  Furthermore, the Tower Amendments constrain the Commis-
sion from regulating issuers of municipal bonds, leaving some 
question as to whether the Commission can or will prescribe similar 
rules for climate risk disclosure for both publicly traded companies 
and municipal bond issuers.7  This article proposes that without the 
regulatory guidance to encourage municipal bond market partici-
 
to Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (June 12, 2008),  
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/petn4-547-supp.pdf [hereinafter Ceres 
supplement I] (regarding supplement to the September 18, 2007 petition). 
 3. See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman, Climate Risk Disclosure Sought, BOND BUYER, Jan. 
13, 2010, http://www. bondbuyer.com/issues/119_257/sec--disclosure-climate-
change-1005977-1.html; Letter from Peter Lehner, Executive Dir., Natural Res. Def. 
Council, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-15-09/s71509-31.pdf [hereinafter Lehner Letter] 
(regarding Release No. 34-60332; File No. S7-15-09, Proposed Amendments to 
Municipal Securities Disclosure); Letter from Tom Sanzillo, Consultant, T.R. Rose 
Assoc., Mark Kresowik, Corporate Accountability Representative, Sierra Club & Lisa 
Anne Hamilton, Counsel, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 8, 
2009), http://www.sec.gov/ comments/s7-15-09/s71509-21.pdf [hereinafter Sanzillo, 
Kresowik, Hamilton Letter] (regarding Release No. 34-60332; File No. S7-15-09, 
Proposed Amendments to Municipal Securities Disclosure). 
 4. Sanzillo, Kresowik, Hamilton Letter, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
 5.  See The Corporate Library, et al., Climate Risk Disclosure in SEC Filings, An 
Analysis of 10-K Reporting by Oil and Gas, Insurance, Coal, Transportation and Electric Power 
Companies 19 (June 2009), http://www.ceres.org/ Document.Doc?id=473 [hereinafter 
Ceres 10K Report] (discussing related costs). 
 6. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–ttt (2006); Securities & Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–lll (2006).  
 7. See Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the 10th 
Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. Corporate, Securities and Financial Law Lecture: 
Regulation of the Municipal Securities Market: Investors are Not Second-Class 
Citizens, (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch102809ebw.htm 
[hereinafter Walter Speech].  
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pants to prepare for the financial, litigation, and regulatory impacts of 
a carbon-constrained economy, an already fragile municipal bond 
market may be exposed to substantial but undisclosed risk.  
Part I of this article provides a broad overview of the municipal 
bond market and a comparison of the differing obligations of issuers, 
brokers, dealers, and underwriters of corporate securities transactions 
versus municipal securities transactions under federal securities laws.  
Part II traces the development of the climate risk disclosure debate 
through investor networks, private voluntary initiatives, and regulatory 
actions for publicly traded companies.  Part III provides an example 
and analysis of voluntary carbon emissions disclosure in the municipal 
bond market and an analysis of the disparities that are likely to arise 
among corporate and municipal securities investors.  
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES 
MARKET 
A. Description of Municipal Securities Market 
Municipal securities are the debt obligations of state and local 
governments (“municipal issuers”)8 that are exempt from the 
registration provisions of the Securities Act and the periodic filing 
provisions of the Securities and the Exchange Act.9  Municipal issuers 
will issue the bonds to build our schools and our universities, 
maintain our water systems, and finance construction of our power 
plants.10  One of the types of municipal bonds most commonly issued 
are general obligation bonds backed by the full faith and credit or 
taxing power of the issuing governmental division.11  Municipal issuers 
may also finance projects using revenue bonds “backed solely by the 
revenue of a specific project.”12  A municipal issuer may also issue 
 
 8. For purposes of this article, “municipal issuer” will refer to all entities that 
avail themselves of the municipal bond market, including “states, their political 
subdivisions such as cities, towns, or counties, or their instrumentalities such as school 
districts or port authorities.”  Walter Speech, supra note 7, at pt. II. 
 9.  Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial Federalism and the Short, Happy Life of 
Municipal Securities Regulation, 34 J. CORP. L. 739, 744 (2009) (discussing how the 
Exchange Act empowers the SEC to exercise authority over all aspects of the 
securities industry including registration, regulation, and oversight of broker-dealer 
activity and self-regulatory agencies including the Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board (MSRB), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD)). 
 10. Walter Speech, supra note 7, at pt. II. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
4
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industrial revenue bonds, also known as conduit bonds, which enable 
a municipal issuer to issue notes on behalf of a third party to whom 
investors both lend money and from whom they receive payment of 
the debt.13  Municipal issuers typically issue conduit bonds to finance 
the construction or manufacturing of certain industrial-type facilities 
by the third party.14 
There are currently $2.8 trillion in outstanding issuances in the 
municipal bond market.15  Additionally, the Treasury Department 
launched the Build America Bonds (BABs) program, which brought 
$35 billion of new taxable BAB bonds to market from April to 
October, 200916 with an expected issuance forecast for 2010 of $85 
billion.17  It is estimated that “$450.5 billion in total tax-exempt 
municipal securities will come to market next year” with $347.5 
billion for long-term issuances, $68 billion in short-term issuance, and 
variable rate demand obligations (VRDO) estimated at $35 billion.18  
Furthermore, the municipal bond market has evolved so that it is no 
longer a “buy and hold” market.19  Other investors include property 
and casualty insurance companies, and commercial banks.  But 
despite their reputation for safety, municipal securities can and do 
default.20 
Since 1999, issuers have defaulted on over $24 billion in munici-
pal bonds.21  In 2008 alone, 140 municipal issuers defaulted on almost 
$8 billion in bonds—up significantly from the previous year, in large 
part due to the credit crisis.22  Most recently, the effects of lack of 
 
 13. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(29) (2006) (explaining the scope of parties to 
municipal securities). 
 14. Walter Speech, supra note 7, at pt. II. 
 15. Id.; cf. Press Release, Jason Farago, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Assoc. (SIFMA), 
SIFMA Issues Report on Findings from Municipal Securities Issuance Survey, 
http://www.sifma.org/news/news .aspx?id=14718 [hereinafter SIFMA Survey 2010] 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
 16. Walter Speech, supra note 7, at pt. II. 
 17. SIFMA Survey 2010, supra note 15.  For an example of the federal govern-
ment attempting to increase the utilization of the BABs program, see Press Release, 
U.S. Treasury Office of Pub. Affairs, Build America Bonds and School Bonds: 
Investing in Our States, Investing in Our Workers, Investing in Our Kids (Apr. 3, 
2009), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/BuildAmericaandSchoolConstruction 
BondsFactsheetFinal.pdf. 
 18. SIFMA Survey 2010, supra note 15.  
 19. Walter Speech, supra note 7, at pt. II. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Joe Mysak, Municipal Defaults Don’t Reflect Tough Times: Chart of Day, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, May 28, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=arkJTEztA2wg.   
 22. Id.  
5
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disclosure and increased complexity have been coming to light.  For 
example, Jefferson County, Alabama is currently over $3 billion 
dollars in debt as a result of its participation in credit defaults swaps 
used to finance its sewage project at a lower interest rate.23  What was, 
a century ago, a sleepy backwater market is now a startlingly large 
municipal bond market that has become increasingly complex, and 
has outgrown the restrictions of the regulatory structure put into 
place decades ago.24  Regulators are becoming increasingly concerned 
that the size and complexity of the market coupled with limited 
availability of information about an issuer’s risk exposure may be 
contributing to the vulnerability of a municipal securities market 
already under stress.25 
What is becoming increasingly alarming is that with so few regu-
lations and limited disclosure, researchers are finding that investors 
will often purchase distressed debt at par value or higher instead of at 
lower prices.26  The lapses in the quality and frequency of disclosure 
prevents investors from having access to informed decision-making 
and enables poor quality investments to be priced and sold at a 
premium without factoring risk into the  price.  The variation in the 
sophistication of the investor will often determine where and what 
information will provide the best source of information about the 
investment.  Institutional investors may rely on professional financial 
analysts to gather information about the municipal issuer’s or the 
obligor’s financial condition, while a retail investor is more likely to 
look to the dealer for any relevant disclosure material.27  On occasion, 
it becomes difficult for underwriters to bid on securities—in either 
the primary or secondary market—issued by municipal issuers with 
 
 23. See Brian Burnsed, Bond Debacle Sinks Jefferson County, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 8, 
2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/nov2009/db2009118_
722581.htm; Gary Palmer, Jefferson County on Verge of Making Bankruptcy History, 
VIEWPOINTS, (Ala. Pol’y Inst., Birmingham, AL.), Mar. 14, 2009, 
http://www.alabamapolicy.org/gary_blog/article.php?id_art=290. 
 24. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech on 
Integrity in the Municipal Market (July 18, 2007)  http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2007/spch071807cc.htm. 
 25. See Erik Sirri, Remarks to the 2008 Bond Attorney’s Workshop of the Nat’l 
Ass’n of Bond Lawyers (Feb. 14, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
2008/ts021408ers.htm (describing the lack of systemic protections in the bond  
market as  an example of the regulatory shortcomings of the market). 
 26.  See Gretchen Morgenson, Red Flags That Muni Investors Can’t See, N.Y. TIMES,  
Mar. 21, 2009, at BU1. 
 27. See MSRB Discussion Paper on Disclosure in the Municipal Securities Market, MSRB 
REPORTS, May 2001, http://www.msrb.org/MSRB1/reports/0501v211/Discussion
Paper12-00--Reports.htm. 
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outstanding continuing disclosure agreements.28  But the advice is 
only as good as the quality of information available.  Poor disclosure 
practices limit the availability of material necessary for informed 
decision-making.  Furthermore, without a requirement to disclose 
exposure to risk caused by the financial and regulatory impacts of 
such known trends as climate change, limited regulation may deprive 
a municipal issuer of any incentive to investigate, assess, and manage 
risk as a preemptive measure.29 
Over the last thirty years, the Commission has inched its way to-
ward improving the quality, availability, and timing of municipal bond 
disclosure.30  However, enforcement efforts are limited both by the 
exemptions from certain provisions of the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts, and by the 
regulatory scheme established in the 1970s—commonly known as the 
“Tower Amendments.”31 
B. Inching Toward Regulatory Reform 
From the beginning, Congress has been deferential to the state 
and local governments that issue the bonds over the interests of the 
municipal bond investor.32  The exemptions from the registration and 
 
 28. Id.   
 29. See Carbon Disclosure Project, The Carbon Chasm, https://www.cdproject.net/
CDPResults/65_329_219_CDP-The-Carbon-Chasm-Final.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 
2010).  “It is widely accepted that if companies don’t measure their emissions, they 
can’t manage them.  So the first step towards managing GHG emissions has to be 
calculating emissions and tracking them over time.”  Id.  See also Population 
Reference Bureau, 360 Risk Project, http://www.lloyds.com/NR/rdonlyres 
/38782611-5ED3-4FDC-85A4-5DEAA88A2DA0/0/FINAL360climatechangereport.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (discussing the insurance industry’s role in encouraging 
responsible and climate proof behavior to price risk and underwrite for profit).    
 30. See Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 742 (describing municipal securities regulation 
as “a tale of call and response between municipal financial fiasco and federal 
regulatory reaction” since 1975).  
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(29) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 103(c)(2) (2009); 15 U.S.C. § 78o–
4(d)(1) (2006).  The statute provides: 
Neither the Commission nor the Board is authorized under this chapter, by 
rule or regulation, to require any issuer of municipal securities, directly or 
indirectly through a purchaser or prospective purchaser of securities from 
the issuer, to file with the Commission or the Board prior to the sale of such 
securities by the issuer any application, report, or document in connection 
with the issuance, sale, or distribution of such securities.  
15 U.S.C. § 78o–4(d)(1).   
 32. Walter Speech, supra note 7, at pt. IV (discussing intergovernmental comity, 
which is not a federalism issue under the Tenth Amendment, and which limits the 
federal government’s ability to regulate state and local governments, as another 
rationale for exempting municipal securities).  Walter argues, however, that this is not 
an issue where the federal government has brought actions for violations of federal 
7
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periodic filing provisions of the ‘33 Act and the ‘34 Act afford 
municipal bond issuers special treatment as to how and when bonds 
are offered in the market.33  Many have argued that the reasons for 
special treatment—lack of perceived abuses in the market, the 
sophistication of the type of investor, and reasons of intergovernmen-
tal comity—are no longer compelling.34  By exempting municipal 
securities from the mandatory disclosure requirements of federal 
securities law, Congress left the distribution and regulation of these 
bonds to the state and local governments that issued them.35  The 
exemption was not reconsidered until the 1970s, when Congress 
revisited the question of exempting municipal bonds after New York 
City’s bond crisis brought to light the fact the municipal bonds were 
not without risk and were not exempt from default.36 
In 1975, in response to the New York City financial crisis, Con-
gress established amendments to the Securities Act that created the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), and a Self Regulat-
ing Organization (SRO) that promulgated rules for the mandatory 
registration broker-dealers and banks that deal in municipal bonds, 
municipal notes, and other municipal securities.37  The amendments 
are silent with respect to any description of mandatory disclosure for 
municipal securities, and the Commission is prohibited from directly 
or indirectly requiring any issuer of municipal securities to provide 
any documents to the Commission.38  These provisions, also known as 
the Tower Amendments, limit the Commission’s authority to impose 
directives upon issuers and frustrate the Commission’s ability to 
protect investors.  Furthermore, the provisions limit the MSRB’s 
authority to require information either pre- or post-sale of the 
securities.39 
 
securities laws to municipal issuers.  Id.   
 33. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 
Municipal Bonds Conference: The Changing Scene for Municipal Securities (Mar. 
11, 1976), http://www.sec. gov/news/speech/1976 /031176sommer.pdf (referring to 
the reluctance of both the banking industry and the securities industry to be 
subjected to regulation of each other’s industry). 
 34. Id.   
 35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–bbb (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–nn (2006). 
 36. See Ann J. Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities: Issues in 
Implementation, 13 J. CORP. L. 65, 66, 72–73 (1987) (describing the New York City debt 
crisis of 1975).  
 37. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified 
as 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1) (2009); Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 742; Walter Speech, 
supra note 7, at pt. III.  
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(1) (2009).  
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(2) (2009).  The statute provides:  
8
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In the years that followed, the Commission’s authority to act has 
been a reactive measure to billion-dollar defaults that defy conven-
tional assumptions about municipal bonds as far too stable to warrant 
regulation.40  In 1988, the Washington Public Power Supply System 
(WPPSS—pronounced “Whoops”) defaulted on $2.25 billion in 
bonds issued to finance the construction of five nuclear power plants 
in the Pacific Northwest.41  In response to findings concerning the 
slow dissemination of information leading up to that crisis, the 
Commission adopted rule 15c2-12 under the Exchange Act, which 
requires underwriters participating in primary offerings of municipal 
securities of $1,000,000 or more to obtain, review, and distribute to 
investors copies of the issuer’s disclosure documents.42  The Commis-
sion also issued interpretative guidance concerning the due diligence 
obligations of underwriters of municipal securities.43 
The WPPSS debacle would be closely followed by the fiscal crisis 
in Orange County, California where the municipal issuer’s participa-
tion in the derivatives market in the 1990s led to the default and 
bankruptcy of the county.44  Prior to that, no major issuer had ever 
defaulted on a general obligation bond.45  The Orange County 
bankruptcy and default followed the loss of an estimated $1.7 billion 
in public funds arising from its participation in the derivatives 
market.46 
 
The Board is not authorized . . . to require any issuer of municipal securi-
ties, directly or indirectly through a municipal securities broker or munici-
pal securities dealer or otherwise, to furnish to the Board or to a purchaser 
or a prospective purchaser of such securities any application, report, docu-
ment, or information with respect to such issuer. 
Id.   
 40. See Walter Speech, supra note 7, at pt. III.  
 41. See DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON THE 
INVESTIGATION IN THE MATTER OF TRANSACTIONS IN WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY 
SYSTEM SECURITIES 1 (1988), http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/
collection/papers/1980/1988_0901_SEC_WPPSS.pdf; John A. Baden & Eric H. 
Espenhorst, Whoops: An Expensive, Valuable History Lesson, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 12, 
1995, at B5.  What remains particularly troubling about WPPSS is that ultimately the 
rate payers bore the brunt of the default by virtue of commitments under take or pay 
contracts that provide the revenue stream to secure the financing for the projects.  Id.  
 42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(a) (2006).  
 43. See Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,985, 54 
Fed. Reg. 28,799 (June 28, 1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240–41). 
 44. See PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY 
BANKRUPTCY 2, 4 (1998),  http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_398OP.pdf 
(describing the County Treasurer’s need to raise more interest income for local 
governments by using the funds on deposit to borrow money to invest in derivatives). 
 45. See id. at 1, 6.  
 46. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 
9
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The Orange County crisis alerted the Commission to the prolife-
ration of risky financial transactions in the municipal bond market 
and inspired a comprehensive review of primary and secondary 
disclosure practices.47  Increased participation in the municipal bond 
market by individuals as direct purchasers and indirect purchasers 
through mutual funds that hold municipal securities called attention 
to the need for better access market information.48  In 1994, the 
Commission adopted amendments to rule 15c2-12 and discussed the 
“duty of underwriters to the investing public to have a reasonable 
basis for recommending any municipal securities, and their responsi-
bility, in fulfilling that obligation, to review in a professional manner 
the accuracy of statements made in connection with the offering.”49 
The regime under the Tower Amendments has created a compli-
cated set of disclosure rules without enforcement, and regulations 
that don’t directly address the issuers responsible for the disclosure.50  
The MSRB rules set standards for dealers of municipal securities, and 
some have argued that even with the limited enforcement provisions, 
the rules are adequately tailored to the unique needs of the municipal 
bond business.51 
C. MSRB Enforcement 
Although the creation of the MSRB was intended to adopt stan-
dards for municipal securities dealers, the MSRB has no enforcement 
capabilities. Instead the MSRB coordinates with the SEC, the Finan-
 
National Federation of Municipal Analysts: Public Trust and Public Obligations in the 
Municipal Bond Market (May 8, 1996), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1996/spch098.txt.  
 47. See generally DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF 
REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET (1993), http://www.sec.gov/info/
municipal/mr-munimarketreport1993.pdf (calling for review of municipal securities 
regulation in light of the diversification of investors and offerings).  
 48. Id.  
 49. Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure Obligations of Municipal 
Securities Issuers and Others, Exchange Act Release No. 33,741, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,748, 
12,758 (Mar. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241).  The release 
stated that the use of “disclaimers by underwriters of responsibility for the informa-
tion provided by the issuer or other parties, without further clarification regarding 
the underwriter’s belief as to accuracy, and the basis therefor, [sic] are misleading 
and should not be included in official statements.”  Id. at n.103.  
 50. See Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 746–47. 
 51. See id. at 747 (discussing the MSRB’s successful implementation of its 
Transaction Reporting system that evolved into the 2005 real-time reporting 
requirement; dealers are now required to submit all transaction information to the 
MSRB within fifteen minutes of execution). 
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cial Industry Regulatory Authority, the Federal Reserve System, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, along with 
other securities and banking rules applicable to broker-dealers and 
banks subject to their respective jurisdictions.52  Additionally, the 
MSRB Rules contain no provision for liability for noncompliance.53  
For example, an issuer’s failure to comply with rule 15c2-12’s 
requirement of providing continuing disclosure documents would 
constitute a breach of contract; however, the rules do not specify any 
consequences for breach of contract.54  And while the MSRB rules are 
specifically customized for municipal securities brokers and dealers, 
the MSRB has no enforcement power.55  Instead, it is the Commission 
that has issued orders to institute proceedings for violations of the 
MSRB rules.56  Where non-exempt municipal bond participants, in 
many instances underwriters, made misstatements or failed to disclose 
material information, the Commission brought proceedings for 
violations of the antifraud provisions of federal securities laws. 57 
 
 52. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o–4 (2006); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTING PRACTICES IN THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 1–2 
(2007) (discussing continued disclosure and enforcement actions involving a wide 
range of disclosure violations by municipal issuers, such as the failure to disclose 
liabilities that place the municipal issuer in serious financial jeopardy, falsely claiming 
a surplus for general and debt service funds, and the failure to disclose material 
information about the municipal issuer high risk investment pool and financial 
condition that brought into question its ability to pay its securities), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-148wp.pdf.  
 53. See Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 742 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)(1) 
(2006)).  
 54. WM Financial Strategies, Municipal Bond Disclosure (2009), 
http://www.munibondadvisor.com/Disclosure%20-%202009Article.pdf. 
 55.  15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(6)(C) (2006). 
 56. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board, Exchange Act Release No. 13,987 (1977), 1977 WL 190812.  
MSRB rule G-19(c) provides that in recommending to a customer any municipal 
security transaction, a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer shall have 
reasonable grounds based upon information available from the issuer of the security 
or otherwise, and based upon the facts disclosed by such customer or otherwise 
known about such customer for believing that the recommendation is suitable. 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Suitability of Recommendations and 
Transactions; Discretionary Accounts (2006), http://www.msrb.org/MSRB1/rules/
ruleg19.htm.  One such example is that  MSRB rule G-17 provides that “each broker, 
dealer, and municipal securities dealer shall deal fairly with all persons and shall not 
engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice” in the course of carrying out 
its municipal securities activities.  Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Conduct 
of Municipal Securities Activities (2006), http://www.msrb.org/MSRB1/rules/
ruleg17.htm.   
 57. See, e.g.,  In re City of San Diego, Securities Act Release No. 54,745 (Nov. 14, 
11
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And while the issuers of the bonds are responsible for preparing 
the disclosures, federal securities law obligates municipal dealers to 
review the issuer’s disclosure documents before offering the bonds.58  
Under the rules, an underwriter is prohibited from participating in a 
municipal offering unless the issuer has agreed to provide continuing 
disclosure documents including annual filings. 
Furthermore, the underwriter must have a reasonable basis to 
justify their belief as to the accuracy and completeness of the repre-
sentations in the document.59  Past amendments to the rules ad-
dressed concerns that ongoing disclosure about municipal securities 
was not available.60  But without any meaningful ability to regulate 
issuers, the Commission has relied on the antifraud provisions to 
reach issuers as an after-the-fact remedy for omitted material informa-
tion.61 
D. Enforcement Under the Antifraud Provisions 
Although the Tower Amendments prohibit the Commission from 
 
2006); In re City of Miami Florida, Exchange Act Release No. 54,745, 89 SEC Docket 
807 (Mar. 21, 2003); In re City of Syracuse, New York Exchange Act Release No. 
39,149, 65 SEC Docket 1199 (Sept. 30, 1997); In re Maricopa County, Exchange Act 
Release No. 37,779, 62 SEC Docket 2574 (Oct. 3, 1996) [hereinafter Anti-fraud 
Investigations]; see also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Municipal Securities Cases and 
Materials, (2009), http://www.sec.gov/info/municipal/ municase07.htm (containing 
full text of certain Commission orders and opinions, administrative law judge 
decisions, litigation releases, and federal court decisions involving participants in 
municipal securities transactions.).    
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b) (2006).  The term “dealer” is used throughout 
to include both municipal brokers and dealers.   
 59. See Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure Obligations of 
Municipal Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and Others, Exchange Act 
Release No. 33,741, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,748 (Mar. 9, 1994) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 211, 
231, 241) (explaining that disclosure had been nearly nonexistent for offerings of 
non-general obligation bonds and smaller issues) [hereinafter 1994 Release]; see also 
Dolphin & Bradbury, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 512 F.3d 634, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(“The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws prohibit fraudulent or 
deceptive practices in the offer and sale of securities.  The issuer of non-exempt 
corporate securities is strictly liable for failing to register a security and for any false 
statements or omissions made in connection with the offering, while underwriters 
may exercise a due diligence defense.”).  Where municipal dealers, including 
underwriters, already have obligations to register under the 1933 Act by virtue of their 
activities for corporate securities clients, market practices indicate differing standards 
for due diligence.  However, municipals securities brokers and dealers are often 
registered by virtue of their participation in corporate transactions subject to the 
registration requirements of the Exchange Act. 
 60. See 1994 Release, supra note 59.   
 61. See sources cited supra note 57. 
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directing issuers to disclose information, the Commission has 
exercised its authority under the antifraud provisions to sanction the 
conduct of issuers, counsel, and other municipal bond participants in 
connection with the offer and sale of municipal bonds.62  Federal 
securities law prohibits fraudulent or deceptive practices in the offer 
and sale of any security including municipal bonds.  As a result, the 
shortcomings of 15c2-12 have not kept the Commission from 
instituting both administrative proceedings and proceedings in 
federal court under the antifraud provisions of section 10b, rule 10b-5 
and under section 17(a) to sanction the conduct of issuers, underwri-
ters, and counsel for misstatements and failure to disclose material 
information in the course of a municipal bond offering.63  The 
Commission has issued cease and desist orders, and brought other 
sanctions against market participants who knew or had reason to 
know that false or misleading statements in the offering documents 
significantly altered the total mix of information as to affect the 
investor’s decision-making.64 
The Commission’s 1994 Interpretive Guidance on the Antifraud 
Provisions responded to the need for greater guidance in describing 
the disclosure obligations for market participants both in connection 
with the primary offerings and continuing disclosure in the secondary 
market.65  In the release, the Commission acknowledged the contribu-
tions of organizations like the National Federation of Municipal 
Analysts (NFMA) and the Government Finance Officers Association 
(GFOA) to publish voluntary guidelines as a roadmap for disclosure.66  
As with each step in the regulatory process before it, the Commission 
recognized that the evolution of the financial markets, which created 
complex and sophisticated municipal bond products, was driving the 
 
 62. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 
12.3 (4th ed. 2002) (stating that rule 10b-5 was promulgated under section 10b(b) of 
the Exchange Act and that rule 10b-1 gives the Commission power to make rules 
prohibiting the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivance in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security).   
 63. See e.g., In re Dauphin County General Authority, Securities Act Release No. 
8415, 82 S.E.C. Docket 2519 (Apr. 26, 2004) (sanctioning an offender for omitting 
material information in the official statement);  SEC v. Michael T. Uberuaga, Civ. 
Action. No. 08 CV 0625 DMS (LSP) (S.D. Cal.), Litigation Release No. 20522, 92 
S.E.C. Docket 3100 (Apr. 7, 2008) (describing instance of five San Diego City officials 
charged with fraud in connection with municipal offerings); see also Municipal 
Securities Cases and Materials: Supplemental Texts (2004–2009), http://www.sec.gov/
info/municipal/municase07.htm. 
 64. TSC Indus., Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).  
 65. 1994 Release, supra note 59.  
 66. Id. 
13
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need for more sophisticated disclosure to fully inform investors.67 
E. Voluntary Disclosure Regime 
A combination of mandatory and voluntary disclosure require-
ments and guidelines inform municipal bond market participants of 
their disclosure obligations.68  The GFOA provides extensive voluntary 
guidelines for what information should be included in the primary 
offering of municipal securities.69  Other groups, including the NFMA, 
have published voluntary disclosure guidelines covering industry-
specific sectors, including, among others, housing, student loans, 
transportation, and health care, which again are commonly followed 
recommendations but are not mandatory.70 
In the summer of 2009, the Commission proposed additional 
amendments to impose further requirements on broker-dealers and 
municipal securities dealers to determine the adequacy of the 
disclosure of specified events by issuers or their obligated persons.71  
Existing requirements under rule 15c2-12 prohibit municipal dealers 
from underwriting securities in the absence of a written agreement by 
the issuer to provide for continuing disclosure documents, including 
annual financial and operating information;72 and notices of any 
eleven material events.73  Additionally, the MSRB filed a proposed rule 
that would permit issuers to disclose a series of certifications to attest 
to the financial reporting of the issuer.74  These newly proposed rules 
 
 67. Id.  
 68. See Cox, supra note 24.  
 69. See DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECURITIES, 
(Gov’t Fin. Officers Ass’n, 1991) [hereinafter GFOA GUIDELINES]. 
 70. See DISCLOSURE HANDBOOK FOR MUNICIPAL SECURITIES, at i, table of contents, 
(Nat’l Fed. of Mun. Analysts, 1992).  
 71. See Proposed Amendment to Municipal Securities Disclosure, Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 60332, 74 Fed. Reg. 36,832 (proposed July 17, 2009) 
[hereinafter Proposed Rules]. 
 72. GFOA guidelines recommend that the financial statements follow GAAP 
principles.  See GFOA GUIDELINES, supra note 69, at xii. 
 73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(C) (2009).  The eleven material events 
include: (1) principal and interest payment delinquencies; (2) non-payment related 
defaults; (3) unscheduled draws on debt service reserves reflecting financial 
difficulties; (4) unscheduled draws on credit enhancements reflecting financial 
difficulties; (5) substitution of creditor liquidity providers, or their failure to perform; 
(6) adverse tax opinions or events affecting the tax-exempt statutes of the security; (7) 
modifications to rights of security holders; (8) bond calls; (9) defeasances; (10) 
release, substitution, or sale of property security repayment of securities; and (11) 
rating changes. 
 74. Walter Speech, supra note 7, at pt. III (discussing the list of information that 
an issuer would be permitted to disclose that would act as a Gold Seal, including (1) 
14
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coincided with the launching of The Electronic Municipal Market 
Access system (EMMA), an electronic delivery system establishing one 
repository of information instead of multiple municipal securities 
information repositories.75  However, all the rules in the world are not 
likely to replace the real impact of enforcement actions.   
To date, the MSRB has never initiated enforcement actions for 
failure to inform investors of prejudicial continuing disclosure 
information in the course of a transaction.76  Additionally, some have 
argued that because Rule 15c2-12 fails to establish liability for 
noncompliance, it is unclear whether the provision subjects issuers to 
liability for misstatements under the rule.77  This lack of specificity in 
 
an undertaking to prepare audited financial statements pursuant to GAAP as 
established by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), (2) an 
undertaking to submit annual financial information to EMMA within 120 calendar 
days after the end of the fiscal year, and (3) receipt by the GFOA in connection with 
the preparation of a Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) of an issuer).  
 75. Prior to the July 1, 2009, launch of the EMMA system, an Internet based 
repository of municipal bond disclosure documents, four NRMSIRs and three State 
Information Depositories (SIDs) maintained information about the municipal bond 
market.  The SIDs include the Municipal Advisory Council of Michigan, the 
Municipal Advisory Council of Texas, and the Ohio Municipal Advisory Council.  The 
four NRMSIRs include Bloomberg Municipal Repository, DPC Data, Inc., Interactive 
Data Pricing and Reference Data, Inc., and Standard & Poor’s Securities Evaluations, 
Inc.  By creating EMMA, the Commission hoped to remedy inconsistent and non-
concurrent delivery of disclosure documents to each of the NRMSIRs.  The Muni 
Council, comprising an informal group of eighteen municipal market participants 
including the NFMA, helped develop the central post office, a conduit for issuers and 
borrowers to file secondary market disclosures more easily.  See SEC, Press Release, 
SEC, MSRB: New Measures to Provide More Transparency than Ever Before for 
Municipal Bond Investors (Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2008/2008-286.htm; see also Proposed Amendment to Municipal Securities Disclosure, 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58255, 73 Fed. Reg. 46, 138 (proposed July 30, 
2008) (proposing amendments to Exchange Act regarding the obligations of the 
broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer). 
 76. See Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 744 (comparing MSRB rules with Regulation 
of Dealer Practices among the SEC, FINRA, and banking regulators); see also Peter J. 
Schmitt, DPC Data Report, Consequences of Poor Disclosure and Enforcement in the 
Municipal Securities Market, http://www.dpcdata.com/html/about-researchpapers.html 
(registration required)[hereinafter Schmitt Report] (explaining a study of 
questionable trading practices based on publicly available information held by the 
NRSMSIRs and the MSRB). 
 77. See Lisa M. Fairchild, Rule 15c2-12: A Flawed Regulatory Framework creates Pitfalls 
for Municipal Issuer, 55 WASH.U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1, 25 (1998) (discussing the 
impact of 15c2-12’s lack of specificity and resulting  uncertainty for municipal issuers 
about their potential liability and how to avoid it); see also David S. Ruder, Chairman, 
U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Disclosure in the Municipal Securities Markets, 
Remarks Before the Public Securities Association (1987) (stating an interpretation of 
underwriters’ obligations in municipal offerings that without strict underwriter 
liability or due diligence defense, underwriters may not engage independent counsel 
15
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rule 15c2-12, coupled with largely voluntary disclosure practices by 
municipal bond market participants, contributes to the lack of credit 
transparency in the bond market.78  Even with the Commission 
exercising its authority under the antifraud provisions, the perception 
persists that the municipal bond market is lightly regulated with few 
instances of enforcement action, leaving municipal bond investors 
vulnerable to abuse.79  According to one study, the lack of rigorous 
enforcement of MSRB Rules G-17, G-19, and G-30 as they pertain to 
the use of continuing disclosure information by dealers has created a 
parallel sense of laxness that is manifested in highly questionable 
trades.80 
The financial crisis highlighted the way in which reliance on rat-
ing agencies impacted market stability and the perception of credit 
worthiness on a variety of financial instruments.  The municipal bond 
market was particularly vulnerable where historically limited access to 
disclosure documents created a reliance on rating agencies as a 
significant piece of information in the total mix of information 
available.  With limited access to disclosure, a typical investor would 
be more likely to rely on word of mouth, the credit rating on the 
bond, and whether the bond enjoyed the protection of bond 
 
for competitive bidding), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1987/102387ruder.pdf.  
But see Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 748 (stating that over time a market shift decreased 
reliance on competitive bidding for deals in favor of negotiated dealing).  See also 
John Evans, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Responsibilities and Liabilities for 
Municipal Offerings (1976), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1976/102976evans.pdf 
(describing pattern of regulation post-1975). 
 78. See generally PETER J. SCHMITT, ESTIMATING MUNICIPAL SECURITIES CONTINUING 
DISCLOSURE COMPLIANCE: A LITMUS TEST APPROACH (2008) (discussing impact of 
voluntary disclosures) (on file with author). 
 79. See MSRB rule G-37, available at http://www.msrb.org/MSRB1/rules/
ruleg37.htm; see also Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisors, 
Investment Advisors Act Release No. IA-2910, 74 Fed. Reg. 39,840 (proposed Aug. 3, 
2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275) (regulating investment advisers under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940). 
 80. See Schmitt Report, supra note 76, at 13.  
A study released in 2008 by this author documented the extent to which 
issuers/obligors in general ignore their own affirmative covenants to make 
regular continuing disclosure filings for as long as their bonds are deemed 
to be outstanding. The study identified the lack of enforcement actions 
involving continuing disclosure pursuant to SEC rule 15c2-12 since the 
requirements went into effect in 1994 as a probable cause for the general 
level of issuer/obligor non-compliance with their own disclosure covenants. 
Id.  “In the absence of regular and close scrutiny of disclosure practices and related 
dealer practices in the municipal market by the two main regulatory bodies over the 
years, the stage was set for the worst possible predatory behavior to take place in 
distressed bonds as the market imploded.”  Id. at 11. 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss3/8
 
1030 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
insurance.81  Prior to the launching of EMMA in 2009, multiple 
repositories for bond documents created a system of unreliable and 
inconsistent access to disclosure information.82  In turn, bondholders 
often relied on the rating agency to determine an investment’s 
creditworthiness.  However, recent investigations revealed that the 
conflicts of interest arising between the rating agencies and the 
entities that paid for the rating can create instances where the 
securities are not always monitored in a rigorous manner.83  “Investors 
may think they are holding investment grade bonds when in fact the 
issuer is teetering on bankruptcy.”84 
 Most experts agree that the rating agencies did not provide the 
necessary backstops in the recent financial crisis for investors.85  
Instead, investors are relying on disclosure documents rather than 
exclusively relying on a bond rating.86  Furthermore, two years after 
the collapse of the auction-rate securities market along with the 
collapse of several bond insurance companies, fewer institutions are 
available to provide credit enhancements, which has left the bond 
market recovering, but vulnerable.87  By some estimates, fewer than 
ten percent of the bonds coming to market today are insured.88  The 
Commission has expressed concern that the presence of credit 
enhancements is not a substitute for material disclosure, particularly 
in instances where the issuer may or may not provide timely continu-
ing disclosure information necessary for an accurate rating.89  
 
 81. Walter Speech, supra note 7, at pt. III. 
 82. See Amendment to Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-59062, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,104 (proposed Dec. 5, 2008) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12) (discussing the inconsistencies among the NRMISRs.  
 83. See Walter Speech, supra note 7, pt. V; see also Credit Ratings Disclosure: 
Proposed Rule, Securities and Exchange Commission Release Nos. 33-9070, 34-60797, 
IC-28942 (Oct. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239, 240, 249 & 274). 
 84. Letter from Scott McCleskey, Head of Compliance, Moody’s, to the SEC 
(Mar. 2009) (“While a few very high profile/frequent issuers (City of New York, etc.) 
were receiving some periodic reviews, the vast majority had received none. . . .”), 
quoted in Gretchen Morgenson, Fair Game: When Bond Ratings Get Stale, NY TIMES, Oct. 
11, 2009, at BU1.  
 85. Walter Speech, supra, note 7, pt. V.  
 86. Id.   
 87. See Paul Sullivan, Wealth Matters: Some Consolation for those in Top Tax Brackets, 
NY TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, at B6 (recommending municipal bond market as an attractive 
wealth-preservation strategy for investors in higher tax brackets). 
 88. See Penelope Lemov, Municipal Bonds Under the Gun, GOVERNING, Dec. 10, 
2009, http://www.governing.com/column/municipal-bonds-under-gun. 
 89. See Municipal Securities Disclosure, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
26,985,  54 Fed. Reg. 28,799 (proposed June 28, 1989); see also Commission’s Final 
Rule Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organiza-
17
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Heightened scrutiny of the rating agencies, along with the disappear-
ance of bond insurers has influenced both retail and institutional 
investors to focus more closely on the disclosure documents of 
municipal issuers.90  The absence of traditional guideposts, including 
protections of credit enhancements and bond insurance, makes 
enhanced disclosure even more essential now than ever before. 
F.  Resisting Emerging Definitions of Material Information 
The Commission continues to make significant progress in im-
proving the regulatory scheme for the municipal bond market even 
with the limitations imposed by the Tower Amendments.91  Despite 
the recommendations of Commissioners and academics to repeal the 
Tower Amendments, the provisions remain in place and continue to 
limit the Commission’s authority to enhance the integrity of the 
municipal bond market.92  In many ways, the Commissioners believe 
that the most recent proposed amendments to enhance municipal 
 
tions, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-61050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832 (Dec. 4, 
2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243) (imposing additional disclosure and 
conflict of interest requirements to address concerns about the integrity and methods 
of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) and discussing the 
Commission’s efforts to remove the reliance on credit rating agencies by stripping the 
reference to nationally recognized statistical rating organizations from SEC rules.); 
Andrew Ackerman, SEC Votes to Remove NRSRO from 38 Rules, BOND BUYER, June 26, 
2008, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/117_121/-290871-1.html; Christopher Cox, 
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting on Rules for 
Credit Rating Agencies (June 11, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2008/spch061108cc.htm. (“The official recognition of credit ratings for a variety of 
securities regulatory purposes may have played a role in investors over-reliance on 
credit rating agencies.”). 
 90. Walter Speech, supra note 7, pt. III (discussing the increased difficulty some 
municipal issuers are having getting credit enhancements for their bonds because of 
the severe financial deterioration of municipal bond insurers); see also Paul Rainy, 
Municipal Bond Credit Report, SEC. INST. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, vol. IV. no. 12, (3rd Qtr. 
2009) http://www.sifma.org/research/pdf/RRVol4-12.pdf (municipal bond credit 
report) (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
 91. Despite discussions about the Commission having exceeded or nearly 
exceeded its power, in 2009, the Commission issued Proposed Amendment to 
Municipal Securities Disclosure, Release No. 34-60332 (July 17, 2009) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240–41).  
 92. Cox, supra note 24; Levitt, supra note 46; Ruder, supra note 77; see also 
Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Hearing Before the S. comm. on Sec’s, Ins., & Inv. 
of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, United States Senate (June 22, 
2009) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n); Walter 
Speech, supra note 7 (supporting the notion that reforms to the MSRB, alternatives to 
public offerings, regulation of financial intermediaries would enhance the municipal 
bond market). 
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bond disclosure may represent the near exhaustion of the Commis-
sion’s authority to regulate municipal bond participants without 
violating the statute.93  And yet the lack of enforcement power over 
disclosure rules in the municipal market has created a no-penalty 
environment that leaves investors defenseless against questionable 
practices by dealers. 94 
While corporations have shareholders to engage in activism as a 
method of accountability, municipal bond investors seem to be at a 
marked disadvantage.  Without the equivalent of shareholder 
advocates for the municipal bond market, emerging trends like 
climate change have gone largely unnoticed and as a result, access to 
material financial information critical to informed decision-making 
remains mostly unavailable to municipal bond investors.95  While it is 
likely that the traditional sources of voluntary information from the 
NFMA and GFOA will generate disclosure guidelines, these provisions 
will likely lag behind corporate initiatives, delaying implementation of 
real methods for assessing and disclosing risk by the issuer.  Such 
delays further frustrate the Commission’s efforts for greater parity in 
the quality of disclosure available to investors. 
III. THE CAMPAIGN FOR CORPORATE CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE 
At the heart of the corporate climate risk debate is whether or 
not the current requirements under Regulation S-K provide corporate 
securities issuers sufficient guidelines about the timing and method 
for disclosing the complex and often speculative information to its 
investors.  Without interpretative guidance from the Commission, 
voluntary disclosure efforts  emerged that described techniques for 
measuring and disclosing the known impacts and uncertainties of 
climate risk with widely varying results.96  At a time when regional 
carbon reduction regimes are being implemented and national 
standards are on the horizon, the municipal bond market’s failure to 
participate in the climate risk debate in a meaningful way highlights 
the significant disparities in the treatment of corporate securities 
 
 93. See Schapiro, supra note 92.   
 94. See Morgenson, supra note 26. 
 95. See infra notes 243–59 and accompanying text.  
 96. See THE CORPORATE LIBRARY ET AL., CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS: 
AN ANALYSIS OF 10-K REPORTING BY OIL AND GAS, INSURANCE, COAL, TRANSPORTATION 
AND ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES (2009), http://www.ceres.org/Document.Doc?id=473 
[hereinafter CERES 10K REPORT], 
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investors in comparison to municipal bond investors.97 
A. Defining Material Climate Risk 
Discussions addressing corporate climate risk disclosure begin 
with an analysis of material fact.  A fact is material if there is a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would 
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly 
altered the total mix of information available.98  Despite continued 
efforts to deny the existence of climate risk, scientists and environ-
mentalists have provided substantial evidence of the current and 
potential physical, litigation, and regulatory risks that can have a 
material impact on a company’s bottom line.99  Furthermore, 
worldwide networks of shareholder activists have demanded disclo-
sure of these risks where access to material information is necessary to 
informed investing in a company and an institutional investor’s ability 
to meet its fiduciary obligations.100 
1. Physical Risk 
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued 
its fourth assessment report on the physical science of climate change, 
which provided the scientific evidence supporting the conclusion that 
the warming of the climate system is unequivocal and that long term 
changes have been observed. 101 
These conclusions sparked global efforts to adopt comprehensive 
initiatives with a particular focus on electric power and transportation, 
 
 97. Walter Speech, supra note 7, pt. IV (stating that investors in municipal 
securities are, in certain respects, afforded “second class treatment” under current 
law). 
 98. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45, 150 (Aug. 19, 1999) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211) (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 
449 (1976)). 
 99. See J. Robert Brown, Corporate Disclosure, Corporate Behavior and Mirror Decision 
Boards, RACE TO THE BOTTOM, Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/
independent-directors/corporate-disclosure-corporate-behavior-and-mirror-image-
boa.html (discussing ExxonMobil’s board of directors and the corporation’s funding 
of organizations that deny the existence of climate change and its impact). 
 100. See Ceres Petition, supra note 2; see also Brown, supra note 99 (relating the 
composition of ExxonMobil’s board of directors and the corporation’s funding of 
organizations that deny the existence of climate change and its impact).  
 101. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR 
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and to limit the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) including 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrof-
luorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluo-
ride (SF6).
102  These initiatives were motivated in part by the 
realization that failure to manage the impacts of increased concentra-
tions of GHGs would have wide-ranging impacts to weather patterns 
manifested in an increased number of storms, sea level rise, and 
changes in temperature.103  Climate change impacts may also include 
water scarcity affecting real estate, agriculture, tourism, health care, 
insurance, fisheries, and forestry.104  What has become clear is that for 
certain sectors, the impact of location will often drive an analysis of 
whether physical risks present a material hazard mandating disclo-
sure.  For example, climate-related changes to coastal properties 
impact not only the availability of insurance but credit risks for banks 
and borrowers in vulnerable areas.  A more detailed discussion of 
private-industry-specific initiatives is included later in this article.105  
2. Regulatory and Policy Risk 
Critics of mandated climate risk disclosure once argued that not 
only is there no link between CO2 emissions and climate change, but 
that the impacts on business were too speculative to disclose.106  But 
even for the most hardened of climate skeptics, there is no denying 
the regulatory impacts of carbon risk as evidenced by the current 
international, national, state, and local efforts to mitigate carbon 
emissions.107 
On June 30, 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
 
 102. See infra notes 138–140 and accompanying text.  
 103. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 101, at 13–15. 
 104. See Ceres Petition, supra note 2, at G-4 (outlining potential effects of global 
warming on businesses.  For example, banks with coastal property may see higher 
rates of storms, which would increase credit risks, and distribution companies may see 
interruptions in deliveries due to storms).  See also Impacts of Global Warming: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. (2009) (Testimony of David G. 
Hawkins, Dir. Climate Programs, Nat’l Res. Def. Council). 
 105. See infra Part III.B.  
 106. See, e.g., Letter from Steven J. Milloy & Thomas J. Borelli, Portfolio Managers, 
Free Enter. Action Fund, to Florence Harmon, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (July 21, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/rules /petitions/2008/petn4-563.pdf 
(requesting that the Commission remind registrants that there is considerable debate 
about global warming and that statements could be in violation of anti-fraud 
provisions of securities laws if found to be false or misleading). 
 107. See CERES 10K REPORT, supra note 96 (citing numerous examples of 
established and proposed international treaties, regulations, and bills seeking to 
combat the emission of greenhouse gases.).  
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granted California and the California Air Resources Board, the 
authority under section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act to implement 
regulations controlling greenhouse gas emissions for new passenger 
cars, pickup trucks, and sport utility vehicles.108  The measure enables 
seventy-three diverse measures for controlling carbon emissions 
including ships idling at ports, low carbon fuel standards, green 
building programs, and standards for industrial refrigeration (among 
other initiatives).109  Other state and regional efforts include the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Emissions Initiative, which is an effort, 
supported by ten northeast and mid-Atlantic states, that has imple-
mented a cap-and-trade system to achieve carbon reduction targets of 
ten percent by 2018.110  Additionally, the Western Climate Initiative’s 
Essential Requirements of Mandatory Reporting, a collaboration by 
several western states and Canada, is a partnership committed to 
monitoring and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.111  Whether these 
 
 108. Notice of Decision Granting Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for 
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards 
for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,767, (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 
74 C.F.R. § 32744-01); Ceres Supplemental Petition II, supra note 2, at 17–19. 
 109. See Jeffrey A. Smith et al., Climate Change: Moving Towards a Brave New World, 3 
CAP. MARKETS L. J. 469 (Oct. 2008) [hereinafter New World Risk] (discussing proposed 
California climate disclosure standard).  In 2008, California’s legislature passed 
Senate Bill 1550 which would have required the State Controller to develop voluntary 
climate change disclosure standard based on the Global Framework for Climate Risk 
Disclosure.  S.B. 1550, 2007–2008 Leg. (Cal. 2008).  However, the State Assembly 
passed an amended version of the bill on August 13, 2008 which failed to pass the 
Senate by one vote.  Id.  See also Letter from Corps. Comm. of the Bus. Law Section of 
the State Bar of Cal., to the Office of Gov’t Affairs (Apr. 24, 2008), 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/buslaw/corporations/2008-06-
06_sb1550_statement-of-position.pdf (critiquing the bill for being duplicative under 
current disclosure requirements under federal securities law).  The legislative efforts 
were consistent with California’s leadership in addressing carbon emissions control 
measures. Id. 
 110. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), CO2 Budget Trading Program, 
About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/about (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).  The ten mid-
Atlantic states participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative include 
Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Vermont.  Id.  The website also includes more 
information about the cap-and-trade system and intended investment for proceeds 
from CO2 allowances auctions.  See id. 
 111. WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, FINAL ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF MANDATORY 
REPORTING (July 15, 2009),  http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/component/
remository/func-startdown/118/.  The Western Climate Initiative’s provincial and 
state partners include Arizona, British Columbia, California, Manitoba, Montana, 
New Mexico, Ontario, Oregon, Quebec, Utah, and Washington.  Western Climate 
Initiative, WCI Provincial and State Partner Contacts, http://www.westernclimate
initiative.org/wci-partners (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).  See also Midwest Greenhouse 
Gas Reduction Accord, http://www.midwesternaccord.org/ (last visited Mar. 31, 
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regulations require new reporting standards for carbon dioxide 
emissions, new vehicle emission standards,112 or compliance with a 
regional cap-and-trade regime, the costs of compliance under 
national, state, and regional carbon mitigation efforts will, if they have 
not already done so, impact the balance sheet of every commercial 
and industrial entity in the country.  Current state and regional 
efforts113 to reach carbon-reduction targets reveal a real and present 
commitment to actively develop agreements and implement steps to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Now commercial entities through-
out the country must comply with state and regional regulatory 
regimes that impact current and future earnings.114 
a. New York State Attorney General 
In the fall of 2007, the office of the New York State Attorney 
General issued subpoenas to five power companies including AES 
Corporation, Dominion Resources Inc., Dynegy Inc., Xcel Energy 
Inc., and Peabody Energy Corporation.115  The New York Attorney 
General expressed concern that where each entity conducted carbon-
intensive activities, its annual filings lacked a description of any 
attempts to evaluate the company’s exposure to climate risk, and that 
by omitting material information, the entities had failed to disclose to 
shareholders the company’s exposure to financial, litigation and 
regulatory risk.116  The subpoenas sought and yielded the first 
 
2010) (updating progress of nine Midwestern governors and two Canadian premiers 
who have signed a participation agreement called the “Midwestern Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Accord.”). 
 112. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 62-285.400 (2009), available at 
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/air/rules/ghg/california. htm (describing Florida’s 
adoption of California’s motor vehicle emission standards). 
 113. See sources cited supra notes 109–110. 
 114. See CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, A MULTI-CITY INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF RETROFIT EMISSIONS CONTROLS IN REDUCING EXPOSURES TO PARTICULATE MATTER IN 
SCHOOL BUSES (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.catf.us/publications/ re-
ports/CATF-Purdue_Multi_City_Bus_Study.pdf.  Traditionally, school buses have 
been exempt from emissions testing.  However, with the new EPA Endangerment 
Findings and studies investigating the detrimental impacts of black carbon in school 
buses, these may be target for future activism.  
 115. The Martin Act authorizes the New York State Attorney General to file civil 
or criminal charges as well as exercise broad investigatory powers to pursue fraud in 
connection with the offer and or sale of securities.  See N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 358 (1996).  
These provisions confer powers that are unusually broad relative to authority 
conferred by other state Blue Sky laws.  
 116. See Letter from Katherine Kennedy, Special Deputy Attorney Gen., Envtl. 
Prot. Bureau, Office of the N.Y. Attorney Gen., to Richard C. Kelly, Chairman, 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Xcel Energy (Sept. 14, 2007), 
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agreements between a publicly traded company and the New York 
Attorney General.117 
Under the terms of the agreements announced in August 2008 
for Xcel and October 2008 for Dynegy, the parties agreed to disclose 
in their respective 10-K filings  
(1) an analysis of financial risks from regulation including the 
material financial risks associated with the present and 
probable future regulations of greenhouse gas emissions; 
(2)  an analysis of financial risks from litigation involving the 
company, the outcome of which will likely have a material 
financial effect on the company, including any climate-
change-related decisions issued, by any court in any jurisdic-
tion in which the company operates; 
(3) an analysis of the physical impacts of climate change that 
pose material financial risks to the company’s operations; 
and  
(4)  a strategic analysis of climate change risk and emissions 
management.118 
On November 19, 2009, the AES Corporation also reached a set-
tlement arising from the 2007 investigation launched by the New York 
Attorney General to disclose more information in its 10-Ks.119  In the 
absence of interpretative guidance from the Commission concerning 
what is required under federal securities law, these agreements 
provided an analytical framework to evaluate whether exposure to 
climate risk is material and a disclosure framework for providing 
shareholders material information to avoid triggering the antifraud 
provisions under federal securities law. 
 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2007/sep/xcel%20energy.pdf. 
 117. In re The AES Corporation, AOD 09-159, (N.Y Atty. Gen., Dep’ts of Inv. Prot. 
& Envtl. Prot., 2009), http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2009/nov/
AES%20AOD%20Final%20fully%20executed.pdf [hereinafter AES Settlement]; see 
also Nicholas Confessore, Xcel to Disclose Global Warming Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 
2008, at C1; see also Karen Freifeld, Dynegy Required to Disclose Climate Change Risks, 
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aby4Iym3BfsE (discussing the Dynegy settlement and how the deal 
required similar reporting requirements to those required of Xcel Energy).  
 118. AES Settlement, supra note 117, at 2–5; In re Dynegy, Inc., AOD 08-132, 3–5 
(N.Y Atty. Gen., Dep’ts of Inv. Prot. & Envtl. Prot., 2009), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
media_center/2008/oct/Dynegyaod.pdf [hereinafter Dynegy Settlement].    
 119. AES settlement, supra note 117, at 2.  The AES settlement is consistent with 
the terms reached in settlements with Dynegy and Xcel settlements. 
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b. Congressional Initiatives 
In June 2009, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009 (ACES), one of the most comprehensive energy bills to address 
the impacts of climate change, passed the U.S. House of Representa-
tives.120  This bill followed the introduction of over 235 bills, resolu-
tions, and amendments addressing climate change and greenhouse 
gas emissions during the 110th Congress.121  At the close of 2009, the 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, in an eleven to 
one vote, approved the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, 
also known as the Kerry-Boxer Bill, which includes details on the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through investment in 
renewable energy sources and the distribution of greenhouse gas 
emissions allowances through a cap-and-trade system.122  In addition, 
the Kerry-Boxer Bill will give the EPA administrator the power to 
designate greenhouse gases and establish the annual tonnage limit on 
greenhouse gas emissions.123 
Should the key elements of the Kerry-Boxer Bill survive, a cap-
and-trade system will be used as a method for gradually reducing 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions.124  Under that 
system, a permit is issued for each ton of GHG that large-scale 
emitters—those producing in excess of 25,000 tons per year—will 
release into the atmosphere.125  Those permits set a cap on the 
amount of GHG that the entity is permitted and over time those 
emission limits become stricter in order to achieve the long-term 
reduction goal.126  Where the task of reducing emissions will be easier 
for some, a system will be created whereby an entity can trade the 
 
 120. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
 121. See, e.g., Ceres Petition, supra note 2 (giving an example of such a petition 
before the 110th Congress).  
 122. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009) 
[hereinafter Kerry-Boxer Bill].  Entities covered by the bill include large stationary 
sources with annual GHG emissions over 25,000 tons, producers and importers of 
petroleum fuels, distributors of natural gas, producers of hydrofluorocarbon gases, 
and other specified large sources.  Id.  Approximately eighty-five percent of national 
greenhouse gas emissions are covered under the cap.  Id.  Like the early drafts, the 
final committee bill draws heavily from the climate provisions of the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act but it continues to differ in several important areas, for 
example, a 2020 reduction target and preemption of certain aspects of EPA 
regulatory authority.  Id.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.   
 125. Id.    
 126. Id.  
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unused permits or tons of emissions on the market to be purchased by 
entities with less effective reduction capabilities.127  The system is 
intended to create a reward for the most efficient companies.128  
However, critics of the bill are particularly concerned about the new 
derivatives market that will be created out of a cap-and-trade system, 
and question the wisdom of creating what may potentially be a volatile 
and therefore risky derivatives market given the outstanding concerns 
over the extent to which aspects of the derivatives market remain 
unregulated or under-regulated.129 
While it is likely that Congress will call upon the SEC, Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, and other regulatory agencies to assist 
with regulating a carbon-trading market, it will complement Congress’ 
earlier efforts to encourage the Commission to provide guidance 
concerning the disclosure of climate risk in the filings of registered 
companies.  On December 6, 2007, Senator Chris Dodd, Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and 
Senator Jack Reed urged then-Chairman Cox to issue guidance on 
climate disclosure “to ensure greater consistency and completeness in 
disclosure of material information related to climate change and 
current and probable future governmental regulation of greenhouse 
gas emissions.”130 
These conclusions were further supported by expert testimony 
before Senator Jack Reed, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Securities, Insurance, and Investment.131  Among those testifying, 
Russell Read, then-Chief Investment Officer of the California Public 
 
 127. Id.  
 128. See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Technical Plan and Project 
Updates, http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1218220137074 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (summarizing the liabilities concerning emissions trading 
schemes, tradable rights, tradable offsets when they are received free of charge, and 
developing accounting models). 
 129. See MICHELLE CHAN, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, SUBPRIME CARBON?: RE-THINKING 
THE WORLD’S LARGEST NEW DERIVATIVES MARKET (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.foe.org/pdf/SubprimeCarbonReport.pdf (arguing that the speculative 
nature of the secondary market has the potential to create a carbon bubble and 
prohibiting offsets as the surest way to ensure asset quality). 
 130. See Letter from Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous. & Urban Affairs, & Sen. Jack Reed, Chairman, S. Comm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. to 
Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 6, 2007), 
http://dodd.senate.gov/multimedia/2007/120607_CoxLetter.pdf.  
 131. See Climate Disclosure: Measuring Financial Risks and Opportunities: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 
110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Russell Read, Chief Investment Officer, California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System). 
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Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) emphasized that certain 
environmental risks and opportunities can affect the performance of 
investment portfolios and that well-positioned companies may be able 
to avoid the financial risks associated with climate risk and capitalize 
on new opportunities including alternative energy technologies.132 
The movement toward regulating a carbon-constrained environ-
ment has also triggered a number of risk assessments and moratoria 
in connection with federal-financing practices and policies.  In March 
2008, the Rural Utilities Service, which provides financing to hun-
dreds of rural electric cooperatives, placed a moratorium on loans for 
any new base load coal-fired power plants until the agency could 
develop a subsidy rate that reflected the risks and costs associated with 
control of greenhouse gas emissions.133  Additionally, in response to 
the Government Accounting Office’s investigation into the possible 
overuse of tax-exempt financing, Comptroller William C. Thompson, 
Jr. cautioned the U.S. Treasury Department to “conduct a thorough 
review of the financial and environmental risks associated with the use 
of tax-exempt financing for coal-fired power plants.”134  Thompson’s 
letter cited the financial obligations to curb greenhouse emissions 
among other speculative costs associated with the construction of coal-
fired power plants that may lead to disruptive debt restructuring and 
premature refinancing over the life of the bonds.135  While only a 
small portion of the tax-exempt funding program is devoted to the 
energy sector, on a project-by-project basis those projects were found 
to be the most cost intensive.136 
c. Executive Branch Initiatives EPA CO2 Endangerment 
Findings 
On December 7, 2009, the EPA, through its  Administrator Lisa 
Jackson, made two findings regarding greenhouse gases (GHG) under 
section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act.137  The endangerment finding 
 
 132. Id.  
 133. See Letter from James M. Andrew, Adm’r, Rural Utils. Serv., Dep’t of Agric., 
to Sen. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Mar. 11, 
2008), http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/ documents/20080312104146.pdf. 
 134. See Letter from William C. Thompson, Jr., Comptroller of N.Y., to Eric 
Solomon, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (June 6, 2008) (on 
file with author)[hereinafter Thompson Letter]. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) 
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concludes that the current and projected concentrations of the key 
well-mixed GHG gases—carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)—pose a threat to human 
health and welfare.138  The Cause or Contribute finding concludes 
that the combined emissions of these well-mixed greenhouse gases 
from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines contribute to 
greenhouse gas pollution, which threatens public health and 
welfare.139  The findings were published in response to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA,140 where the court held that 
greenhouse gases are air pollutants covered under the Clean Air 
Act.141  The decision stated that the statute requires the EPA to 
determine whether or not emissions of greenhouse gases from motor 
vehicles cause or contribute to air pollution, which may endanger 
public health or welfare, or whether the science is too uncertain to 
make a reasoned decision.142  The Supreme Court’s decision resulted 
from a petition for rulemaking under section 202(a) filed by more 
than a dozen environmental organizations.143  This action does not in 
and of itself impose any requirements on industry or other entities.  
Rather, this action is a prerequisite to finalizing the EPA’s proposed 
greenhouse gas emission standards for light-duty vehicles, which were 
jointly proposed by EPA and the Department of Transportation’s 
National Highway Safety Administration on September 15, 2009.144 
As a result, the EPA will begin working on lowering emissions.145  
Cap-and-trade measures will be controlled through New Source 
Performance Standards and Title V of the Clean Air Act, and the 
 
[hereinafter Endangerment and Cause]; see also EPA, Climate Change—Regulatory 
Initiatives, http://www.epa. gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2010). 
 138. Endangerment and Cause, supra note 137, at 66,516.   
 139. Id. at 66,496. 
 140. Mass. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 141. Id. at 532. 
 142. Id. at 532–34. 
 143. Id. at 510. 
 144. See Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 
49,454 (proposed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 537–38); 
EPA, Climate Change, Regulatory Initiatives, Endangerment and Cause or 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under the Clean Air Act, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).   
 145. EPA, Climate Change, Regulatory Initiatives, Endangerment and Cause or 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under the Clean Air Act, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss3/8
 
1042 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
United States will likely shed coal plants with older technology to 
comply with emissions standards.146  Administrator Jackson described 
the rule as a “common-sense rule tailored to apply to only the largest 
facilities—those that emit at least 25,000 tons of carbon dioxide a 
year—which are responsible for nearly 70 percent of greenhouse gas 
emissions in the United States.”147  Critics argue that the comprehen-
sive regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act will 
impose a substantial cost, allow insufficient flexibility, and, ultimately, 
result in an overreaching of the Agency to impose a regulatory regime 
that exceeds what was ever intended under the Clean Air Act.148  
House and Senate Republicans opposed to the EPA’s actions argue 
that the regulations are a job-killer.149 
On October 5, 2009, President Barack Obama signed Executive 
Order 13514, which instructs federal agencies to set or achieve various 
emissions reduction and energy and environmental benchmarks by 
2015, 2020, and 2030.150  The order requires agencies to set GHG 
emissions reduction targets for 2020 within ninety days.151  The order 
also sets out required reductions in vehicle fleet petroleum use and 
requires increases in water and energy efficiency and in recycling and 
waste diversion rates.152  The order also mandates adoption of certain 
contract and procurement practices designed to promote energy and 
water efficiency and environmentally preferable products.153  The 
Executive Order, along with the EPA’s findings, were intended to 
bolster the President’s negotiation leverage in Copenhagen by having 
regulatory proof that the U.S. is serious about tackling climate 
 
 146. See ENERGY PUB., INC., COAL & ENERGY PRICE REPORT, vol. II, 4 (2009) (on file 
with author). 
 147. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Moves to Curtail Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 1, 2009, at A1; see also Memorandum from Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP, 
Legal Alert: EPA Publishes Tailoring Rule Requirements for Greenhouse Gases from 
Stationary Sources (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.sutherland.com/alertspubs/ (enter 
keyword “greenhouse”). 
 148. See Maura Judkis, EPA: Greenhouse Gases are a Public Health Hazard, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. Apr. 17, 2009 (noting the response of EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson 
to comments made by Scott Segal, Director of the Electric Reliability Coordinating 
Council, which lobbies on behalf of Southern Company and Duke Energy Corp.).  
Critics warned that the EPA’s regulation of CO2 would apply to everything from cows 
to Dunkin’ Donuts.  Broder, supra note 147, at A1.   
 149. See Susan Jones, EPA Attempt to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions Will Kill Jobs, 
Critics Warn, CNSNEWS.COM, Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/
58206. 
 150. Exec. Order No. 13514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117–119 (Oct. 8, 2009).   
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 52,118. 
 153. Id.  
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change.154  However, many have considered the results of the meet-
ings an utter failure.155  Despite a disappointing (but not unexpected) 
result in Copenhagen, the U.S. made steps toward agreeing to 
commitments to reduce carbon emissions by 2020.  The accord, while 
not legally binding, marks a substantial step toward U.S. commitments 
to a 14%–17% decrease in GHG emissions from 2005 levels by 2020.156 
Ultimately, these regulatory initiatives will have material impacts 
on every sector in the U.S. economy but will significantly impact the 
transportation and energy sectors as the two largest sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Industry waits with bated breath to 
determine the extent to which the United States will commit to 
comprehensive initiatives to reduce carbon emissions that will in turn 
create material financial risks and opportunities for nearly every 
sector of the market.  From the perspective of the registered compa-
ny, their financial conditions will increasingly depend on whether or 
not they are well-positioned to manage regulatory costs and capitalize 
on new business opportunities arising from national commitments to 
reduce carbon emissions and decrease dependence on foreign oil in 
favor of developing renewable sources of energy including, but not 
limited to, wind and solar.157 
 
 154. See id.  
 155. John Vidal et al., Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure, 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 19, 2009, , 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal (opining 
that the lack of deeper emission cuts could lock developing countries into a cycle of 
poverty forever). 
 156. See United Nations Climate Change Conference, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–
18, 2009, Copenhagen Accord,  Appendix I, available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/science/earth/20091218CLIMATE_TEXT.pdf; see also Posting of 
Kenneth G. Lieberthal & John L. Thornton to The Brookings Institution Up Front 
Blog, (Dec. 23, 2009) http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1222_china_
climate_lieberthal.aspx (arguing that the benefits of the “failure” in Copenhagen 
include successful avoidance of a total breakdown in negotiations and a more 
pragmatic approach to reducing carbon emissions which will likely result in a 
“combination of national, bilateral and regional initiatives, along with negotiations 
among the group of major greenhouse gas emitters (about 15 countries account for 
over 90 percent of global emissions)”). 
 157. Although beyond the scope of this analysis, it is believed that the growth in 
Clean Technology from $500 million in 2001 to $8.4 billion in 2008 reflects the 
expectation of a carbon-constrained marketplace.  See Press Release, Cleantech 
Group, LLC, Clean Technology Venture Investment Reaches Record $8.4 billion in 
2008 Despite Credit Crisis and Broadening Recession (Jan. 6, 2009), 
http://cleantech.com/about/pressreleases/010609.cfm. 
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3. Litigation Risk 
Climate change has been at the focus of litigation under theories 
of common law nuisance actions in addition to violations under 
statutory and regulatory schemes.  One of the anticipated conse-
quences of the EPA’s findings that greenhouse gases endanger the 
public health and welfare is that opponents to the construction of new 
carbon intensive projects may sue under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA)158 or its state law equivalents.  Based on this 
finding, “it seems likely that any development that generates signifi-
cantly more vehicle trips and any power production or manufacturing 
project that results in significantly more GHG emissions could be 
subject to challenge based on a failure to adequately assess its climate 
change impacts.”159 
Furthermore, there are likely to be new tort claims based on a 
theory of common law nuisance where the plaintiffs allege harm 
suffered as a result of a defendant’s activities that contribute to 
climate change.160  In 2005, eight state attorneys general, the city of 
New York, and three land trusts filed federal common law public 
nuisance claims against six electric power companies for harm 
suffered as a result of the defendants’ activities that contribute to 
concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate 
change.161  The District Court found that plaintiffs did not have 
standing to bring a case of nuisance and that the case was a political 
question better addressed by another branch of government.162  On 
September 21, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
vacated and remanded the district court’s findings, allowing the 
plaintiffs’ claims to proceed.163  The Second Circuit rejected the 
grounds on which the district court had identified a political question 
and held that the EPA’s preliminary finding did not definitively 
require regulation to address climate change and that other federal 
remedies are not barred on political question grounds where 
 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). 
 159. Memorandum from Steven Jones, Marten Law Group, EPA’s Endangerment 
Finding Could Spur More NEPA, Nuisance Litigation (Dec. 10, 2009), 
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20091210-epa-endangerment-finding. 
 160. See COLUMBIA LAW SCH. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S. LITIGATION CHART 
(2010), available at http://www.climatecasechart.com. 
 161. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 162. Id. at 265. 
 163. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 393 (2d Cir. 2009).  
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Congress had not legislated GHG emissions.164  Furthermore, the 
court determined that the allegations of current and future injury 
associated with climate change were sufficient to establish judicial 
standing to assert claims against electric utilities.165  For large emitters 
of greenhouse gases, whose operations generate 25,000 metric tons or 
more per year, the Court’s decision provides yet another reason why 
efforts to assess climate change are material to an emitter’s financial 
condition and demonstrates that climate risk is no longer speculative 
and instead may be the basis for triggering future litigation.166 
In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, plaintiffs with properties along the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast filed suit against several petro-chemical 
companies seeking damages and alleging that the defendants’ 
operations of energy, fossil fuel, and chemical industries in the 
United States caused the emission of greenhouse gases that contri-
buted to global warming by increasing the surface air and water 
temperature.167  Plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ activities caused 
the rise in sea levels adding to the severity of Hurricane Katrina, 
which destroyed their private property and the public property that 
was useful to them.168  Following the second circuit’s decision in 
Connecticut, the fifth circuit reversed in part the district’s court 
decision holding that plaintiffs had the standing to raise nuisance, 
trespass, and negligence claims and that those claims were justicia-
ble.169 Ultimately, the potential for litigation under the new EPA rules 
or for suits filed under a theory of federal common law public 
nuisance signals how an entity may need to position itself to respond 
 
 164. Id. at 332. 
 165. Id. at 349. 
 166. See Memorandum from Ben Lippard, Vinson & Elkins, LLP, Second Circuit 
Opinion on Connecticut v. American Electric Power—Nuisance Claims Against 
Companies Emitting GHGs (Sept. 25, 2009), 
http://www.vinsonelkins.com/resources/ SecondCircuitOpinionConnecticutvAmE-
lecPower.aspx (recommending that the second circuit’s opinion should be studied 
closely by industrial operators that emit significant quantities of greenhouse gases, to 
understand the potential for future litigation).  
 167. 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 168. Id. at 859. 
 169. Id. at 879–80. But see Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. 
Supp. 2d 863, 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (describing that an Eskimo village claimed that 
global climate change was traceable to the defendants and made their village 
uninhabitable and sought damages for the cost of relocating the village).  The district 
court concluded that the lawsuit raised a non-justiciable political question and that 
the plaintiffs did not have standing because their harm was not fairly traceable to the 
defendants’ conduct, rejecting the second circuit’s analysis in Connecticut v. American 
Electric Power Co., Inc.  Id. 
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to the potential impact of future litigation. 
B. Private Initiatives to Address Climate Risk 
In the absence of Commission-articulated guidance, private enti-
ties have acted preemptively within their sectors by providing 
guidance to assess and disclose the exposure to climate risk.170  In 
addition to public sector initiatives, private organizations are address-
ing climate risk by developing a framework of guidelines to assess and 
disclose climate risk and thereby mitigate potential losses.171  In 
response to a carbon-constrained market, private entities across every 
sector of the economy have already begun to analyze and report 
current exposure to climate risk.172 
1. Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives 
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners began 
requiring insurance companies with premiums in excess of $500 
million dollars to disclose to regulators and to the public their 
exposure to financial risks from climate change.173 The Commission-
ers reasoned that “insurer disclosures will allow regulators to under-
stand the impact of climate change on insurance (property, casualty, 
life and health) including its availability, affordability, and solven-
 
 170. See infra notes 171–82 and accompanying text.   
 171. See Perry E. Wallace, Climate Change, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate Law 
Duties, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 757, 759 (2009) (discussing Andrew J. Hoffman’s 
Carbon Strategies: a three-stage method for providing a roadmap for a corporate 
climate strategy). 
 172. See Ceres Petition, supra note 2; see also Letter from Karina Litvack, Dir., Head 
of Governance & Sustainable Inv., F&C Mgmt., et al. to Florence E. Harmon, Acting 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (June 12, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/rules/
petitions/2008/petn4-547-supp.pdf (providing supplemental information to the 
Request for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Disclosure petition filed on September 
18, 2007). 
 173. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS., INSURER CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE SURVEY 1 
(2008), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_climate_
climate_risk_disclosure _survey.pdf (requiring answers to the following: (1) plans for 
assessing, reducing, or mitigating its emissions; (2) policy for risk and investment 
management; (3) process for identifying climate change-related risks and business 
impacts; (4) current and anticipated climate change risks; (5) investment strategy 
response to climate change impacts; (6) steps to encourage policy holders to reduce 
losses caused by climate change-influenced events; (7) steps to engage key consti-
tuencies on climate change; and (8) action to manage climate change risks including 
the use of computer modeling).  The drafters reasoned that these disclosures should 
provide good insights to risks insurance companies are insuring as more businesses 
face liability from environmental events such as floods, tropical storms, and the like. 
Id. 
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cy.”174  The Commissioners further concluded that climate risk is 
critical to insurer solvency and insurance availability, and will aid 
regulators as they assess an insurer’s risk assessment.175 
Additionally, several of the nation’s financial institutions have 
also addressed climate risk as material information that impacts both 
an investor’s ability to make informed investment decisions and a 
financial institution’s ability to assess project economics within the 
parameters of carbon risk and financing arrangements.176  JPMorgan 
Chase, Citi, and Morgan Stanley, in partnership with power compa-
nies and other environmental shareholders, authored and publicly 
pledged a commitment to the Carbon Principles in February 2008.177  
The Carbon Principles include the “Enhanced Environmental” due 
diligence recommendations, which provide a process for evaluating 
carbon mitigation strategies among the range of financing considera-
tions for the construction of fossil fuel generation facilities, including 
coal-fired power plants.178 
Additionally, private initiatives within sectors have been coupled 
with efforts to participate across sectors in global networks of 
corporate entities who voluntarily disclose climate risk.  A variety of 
investor networks including the Investor Network on Climate Risk 
(INCR)179 and the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change 
(IIGCC)180 collaborated to encourage companies to apply new 
disclosure recommendations through a variety of reporting mechan-
isms including the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP)181 and the Global 
 
 174. Posting of William Um & John Wyckoff to Global Climate Law Blog, 
http://www.globalclimatelaw.com /2009/03/articles/insurance-recovery/insurance-
companies-required-to-disclose-climate-change-risks-will-disclosure-facilitate-risk-
mitigation-climate-change-regulation-or-litigation/ (Mar. 26, 2009). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase & Co., Carbon Principles, 
http://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmc/community/env/carbon (last visited Feb. 
22, 2010) [hereinafter Carbon Principles]; JP MORGAN CHASE & CO., CLIMATE CHANGE 
INVESTMENT RESEARCH (2008), http://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/
investbk/solutions/research/climatechange [hereinafter Climate Change Investment 
Research].    
 177. See Carbon Principles, supra note 176.   
 178. See Carbon Principles, supra note 176. 
 179. Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) Home Page, http://www.incr.com 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
 180. IIGCC Home Page, http://www.iigcc.org/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
 181. Carbon Disclosure Project Home Page, https://www.cdproject.net (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2010) (explaining that the CDP was launched in 2000 to collect and 
distribute data concerning how organizations around the world measure and manage 
greenhouse gas emissions and make performance improvements to minimize their 
exposure to risk and maximize business opportunities).  
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Reporting Initiative (GRI).182 
2. Shareholder Resolutions and New SEC Proxy Rules 
Shareholder activism has been a powerful force in raising aware-
ness about the physical, regulatory, and litigation impacts of climate 
change on the financial condition of registered companies.  Investor 
networks, often representing trillions of dollars of assets, have 
orchestrated a movement among shareholders to submit resolutions 
urging boards to report on the company’s climate risk assessment at 
annual shareholder meetings.183  If the resolution met statutory 
guidelines and survived scrutiny, the resolution would be presented 
for vote before all shareholders.184  The process enables shareholders 
with an ownership and fiduciary interest in the activities of publicly 
registered corporations to influence corporate behavior.185 
During the 2008 proxy season, a record fifty-seven climate-related 
shareholder resolutions were filed with U.S. companies with the 
intent of engaging corporate management and encouraging en-
hanced disclosure.186  Until recently, the Commission allowed 
companies to reject shareholder resolutions through a no action 
request if the resolution linked environmental or social issues to a 
company’s evaluation of risk.187  On October 27, 2009, the Commis-
sion’s Division of Corporation Finance issued Staff Legal Bulletin 14E 
(CF), providing guidance for companies and shareholders regarding 
rule 14a-8 with respect to shareholder proxy proposals relating to risk, 
succession plans for a company’s chief executive officer, and the 
manner by which shareholder proponents and companies can notify 
 
 182. The GRI works closely with CDP on sustainability reporting of environmental 
and social dimensions of corporate activities, products, and services and is a 
repository for information for how corporations disclose significant information 
regarding climate risk.  Id.  
 183.  These organizations include the INCR, IIGCC, and Interfaith Center for 
Corporate Responsibility (ICCR).  ICCR Home Page, http://www.iccr.org (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2010); see also supra notes 179–80.  
 184. Ceres, led by its president Mindy Luber, is a national network of investors, 
environmental organizations, and other public interest groups working with 
companies and investors to address sustainability challenges such as global climate 
change.  Ceres Home Page, http://www.ceres.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
 185. See Sung Ho (Danny) Choi, It’s Getting Hot in Here: The SEC’s Regulation of 
Climate Change Shareholder Proposals Under the Ordinary Business Exception, 17 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 165, 172–73 (2006).  
 186. See Ceres, Shareholder Action, http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=428 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
 187. See Choi, supra note 185, at 176–77. 
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the commission about submitting a no-action request.188  Rather than 
focusing on whether a proposal and supporting statement relates to 
the company engaging in an evaluation of risk, the Commission will 
now consider whether the underlying subject matter of the risk 
evaluation involves a matter of ordinary business to the company.189  
The ruling makes it easier for investors to demand climate change 
disclosure from listed companies via shareholder resolutions includ-
ing the financial risks companies face from environmental and social 
issues.190  The hundreds of shareholders resolutions seeking enhanced 
disclosure demonstrates a real need for material information 
concerning a company’s exposure and its assessment of the potential 
and actual liabilities arising from a carbon-constrained economy.191 
3. Ceres Petition for Interpretive Guidance 
In the campaign for mandatory climate risk disclosure, share-
holder activists advocated a broader reading of a company’s existing 
obligations to disclose material environmental information under 
federal securities law and under generally accepted accounting 
principles.  It was argued that adaptation of a broader reading of 
these provisions would provide investors with access to enhanced 
information concerning a company’s assessment of its material 
climate risk exposure.192  Their efforts reflect a growing belief among 
shareholders that the potential impacts of climate change on a 
registered company include (1) the possibility of damage to property, 
(2) interruption of revenue streams, (3) increased costs incidental to 
complying with regulations, and (4) all potential liability in lawsuits 
reasonably likely to have a material impact on a company’s financial 
performance.193 
Beginning in October of 2006, a group of leading investors from 
 
 188. See SEC, Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E(CF) (Oct. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14e.htm. 
 189. Id.  
 190. See Press Release, Ceres, Ceres Applauds SEC Decision Allowing Financial 
Risks in Environmental and Social Resolutions (Oct. 28, 2009), 
http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=1145; see also SEC, Guidance To Ease Climate 
Change Resolutions, ENVTL. FINANCE, Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.environmental-
finance.com/onlinews/2910sec.html. 
 191.  See Press Release, Ceres, Investors Achieve Major Company Commitments on 
Climate Change (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=1121. 
 192.  Ceres Petition, supra note 2, at 7–10.  
 193. See Peter L. Gray, The SEC is Getting Hot and Bothered Over Climate Change, 
METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, at 11 (2008), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel
.com/pdf/2008/January/11.pdf. 
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around the world, led by Ceres, released the Global Framework for 
Climate Risk Disclosure.194  The framework provided companies a list 
of expectations and criteria investors wanted to see from corporations 
about their total greenhouse gas emissions production and called for 
a plan to manage emissions and a risk assessment of the anticipated 
physical and regulatory impacts.195 
In September of 2007, a coalition of state officials, shareholder 
advocates, and environmental groups, led by Ceres, petitioned196 the 
Commission seeking interpretative guidance to clarify climate risk 
disclosure as material information that, if undisclosed, could impact 
an investor’s ability to make informed decisions.197  The petition also 
requested clarification on the scope and substance of disclosure about 
the financial, regulatory, and litigation impact of climate risk on a 
corporation’s financial stability.198  Investor groups like Ceres have 
documented the competitive disadvantage power-generating entities 
may face as a result of (1) heightened exposure to the physical risks 
from climate change, (2) the regulatory risks related to proposed 
greenhouse gas emission limits, (3) the indirect regulatory risks and 
the opportunities related to products or services from high emitting 
companies, and (4) litigation risks for emitters of greenhouse gases.199  
While the Ceres Petition and its supplements galvanized the efforts of 
Investor Networks and Corporate Boards, they also challenged 
assumptions concerning the adequacy of existing environmental 
disclosure procedures under federal securities law.200 
C. Disclosing Climate Risk Under Federal Securities Law 
Regulation S-K under the Exchange Act provides the scope and 
substance of required non-financial disclosures for publicly traded 
companies in its annual reports (Form 10K), its quarterly reports 
 
 194. See GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE: A STATEMENT OF 
INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS FOR COMPREHENSIVE CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 1–3 (2006), 
http://www.calstrs.com/Investments/Global Framework_Climate.pdf. 
 195. Id. at 6–8. 
 196. Ceres Petition, supra note 2, at 1. 
 197. Hearing Before the U.S. Cong. Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv, 110th Cong. (Oct. 
31, 2007) (testimony of Mindy Lubber, Pres. of Ceres and Dir. of INCR). 
 198. See Ceres Petition, supra note 2, at 51–53; see also Ceres Supplement I, supra 
note 2, at 5–6; Ceres Supplement II, supra note 2, at 21–27.  
 199.  See Ceres Petition, supra note 2, at 53; see also CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE IN 
SEC FILINGS: AN ANALYSIS OF 10-K REPORTING BY OIL AND GAS, INSURANCE, COAL, 
TRANSPORTATION AND ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES 2–3, (2009), 
http://www.ceres.org/Document.Doc?id=473 [hereinafter Ceres 10K Risk]. 
 200. Smith Transcript, infra note 205.  
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(10Q), and its episodic filings (8K).201  Climate risk activists have 
argued that the provisions registered companies currently apply to 
disclose environmental impacts should be expanded and clarified for 
purposes of disclosing climate risk liabilities.202 
1. Item 101 
Item 101 requires disclosure of material effects of compliance 
with federal, state, and local environmental law provisions.203  
Traditionally, such disclosure would include a description of the 
capital expenditures, earnings, and competitive position of the 
company and its subsidiaries.  This might also include a description of 
capital expenditures necessary to comply with enacted or adopted 
environmental regulations or initiatives to protect the environment, 
including the acquisition of control facilities as well as any material 
acquisition of plant and equipment necessary to the registered 
company’s business activities.204  Authors of the Ceres petition argued 
for a broader reading of this provision that includes a recommenda-
tion that registrants should also disclose the challenges that climate 
risks present to the general development of business, including the 
impact of the costs of energy and contingency planning for extreme 
weather.205  While it is unsettled whether this broader reading of the 
provision should prevail, it is largely agreed that any material 
expenditures a company makes to comply with climate change 
regulations would be disclosed under this provision, including those 
costs associated with complying with the multi-state regional initiatives 
like RGGI and WCI.206 
2. Item 103 
Item 103 requires disclosure of any material pending legal pro-
ceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the 
business, to which the registrant or any of its subsidiaries is a party, or 
 
 201. See Rose, infra note 230, at 2 n.3. 
 202. Ceres Petition, supra note 2, at 40–42.  
 203. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2007). 
 204. Id.  
 205. See Jeffrey Smith, Climate’s Impact on Securities Disclosures, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10128 (2008) (transcribing a speech given by Smith at the 
September 27, 2007 Environmental Law Institute seminar) [hereinafter Smith 
Transcript].   
 206. See Gray, supra note 193. 
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which any of its property is the subject.207  Additionally, the company 
subject to litigation must accrue a charge if it is probable that the 
liability has been incurred and can be reasonably estimated.208  But no 
disclosure is required where the monetary sanctions are less than ten 
percent of the company’s assets or if a government agency is involved 
and the possibility of sanctions imposed is less than $100,000.209 
A broader interpretation of Item 103, which some have called an 
extrapolation, may include disclosing litigation that could have a 
significant impact on the registrant’s sector even if that registrant is 
not a party to the litigation.210  For example, a registrant that is a large 
emitter of carbon dioxide may want to assess and disclose the risk for 
potential litigation, if reasonably likely, as a result of the Comer v. 
Murphy Oil and Connecticut v. American Electric Power decisions, where 
the Second and Fifth Circuits have acknowledged that a party can 
state a cause of action under a federal common law public nuisance 
theory for the harm caused by a registrant’s greenhouse gas emissions 
that contribute to climate change.211 
3. Item 303, Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) 
Item 303, the Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations, requires the disclosure of 
material effects of known trends, events, or uncertainties that may 
impact a company’s financial condition, changes in financial condi-
tion, and its operations.212  This section also requires disclosure of off-
balance sheet arrangements that materially affect or are reasonably 
likely to have a material effect on the financial condition, changes in 
financial condition, revenues or expenses, results of operations, 
liquidity, capital expenditures, or capital resources on the results of 
 
 207. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2007). 
 208. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 92, 56 Fed. Reg. 33, 376 (June 14, 1993) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229.103).  
 209. Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416, 474–75 (N.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
 210. See Smith Transcript, supra note 205, at 10128.  
 211. Id. at 10129; Comer v. Murphy Oil, 585 F. 3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009); Connecti-
cut v. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); see also SEC Staff Accounting 
Bulletin No. 92, 56 Fed. Reg. 33,376 (June 14, 1993) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
229.103) (mandating that corporations must disclose charges accrued for environ-
mental liabilities where it is probable that the liability was incurred and can be 
reasonably estimated and where liability is a reasonably probable result of legal 
proceedings). 
 212. See Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2009).    
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operations.213 
The 1989 MD&A Interpretative Release provides the starting 
point of analysis to determine when and a how a company must 
disclose material known events and uncertainties by conducting a 
probability/magnitude test as defined by the Supreme Court.214  It 
recommended that a company distinguish between (1) information 
that must be disclosed and (2) forward-looking information, of which 
disclosure is optional.215  The release further provides that in order for 
a registrant to determine whether information is prospective and 
therefore must be disclosed, the registrant should assess (1) the 
likelihood that the known trend will come to fruition, and (2) that if 
management cannot make a determination it should objectively 
evaluate the trend, assume that it will come to fruition, and determine 
whether it is reasonably probable that the effects would have a 
material effect on operations and, if so, disclosure would be re-
quired.216 
The 2003 MD&A Interpretative Release further provides that 
uncertainties in the MD&A not only encompass both financial and 
non-financial factors that may influence the business either directly or 
indirectly, but also may include matters that often precede accounting 
recognition when the registrant becomes aware of information that 
creates a likelihood of material effect on its financial condition or 
results of operation.217  Practitioners agree that this guidance applies 
to the scientific findings, statutory and regulatory initiatives, as well as 
recent court rulings that all support the conclusion that climate 
change is a material known trend.218  However, the question remains 
whether the known and likely liabilities of climate risk are reasonably 
 
 213. Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(4) (2009).  These arrangements include 
retained or contingent interest in assets and actual or contingent obligations arising 
out of a material variable interest.  Id. at (a)(4)(ii).  The third requirement under 
Item 303 includes disclosure of payment amounts due under long term contractual 
liabilities on its balance sheets.  Id. at (a)(4)(i)(C). 
 214. See Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and 
Results of Operations, 54 Fed. Reg. 22427 (May 18, 1989) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
211, 231, 241, 271) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Basic v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224 (1988)) [hereinafter MD&A Release]. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id.  
 217. See SEC Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange Act 
Release No. 
48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241). 
 218. Id.; see also Smith Transcript, supra note 205.    
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estimable enough to influence financial conditions—and if so, 
whether those financial conditions are reasonably likely to result in a 
material impact on the company’s liquidity, capital resources, 
revenues, and results of operations, including income from continu-
ing operations.219 
4. Other Supplemented Disclosure in the 10-K 
A number of practitioners have noted that in the absence of 
guidance by the Commission on how to disclose climate risk, regis-
tered companies may also disclose material climate risk in Item 503(c) 
pursuant to Regulation S-K, which requires disclosure in the registra-
tion statement and periodic reports that discuss specific factors or 
changes that make an offering particularly risky or speculative.220  
Companies may also include details about climate risk in the Forward 
Looking Statements’ safe harbor provisions, as well as in the notes to 
the financial statements.221 
Furthermore, Regulation FD prohibits certain selective disclo-
sures of material nonpublic information so that if a company’s 
disclosure is selective, or incomplete about material climate risk 
exposure, omission of these facts may trigger violation of federal 
securities law.222  Additionally, practitioners have relied on Staff 
Accounting Bulletin 99 for guidance on determining whether 
environmental information is sufficiently material to warrant disclo-
sure pursuant to Items 101, 103 and 303 of Regulation S-K.223  
 
 219. See SEC Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange Act 
Release No. 
48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241); 
see also SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Significant Issues Addressed in the 
Review of the Periodic Reports of the Fortune 500 Companies, 
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
 220. See JANE WHITT SELLERS ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE: CREEPING UP THE 
LEARNING CURVE—WILL DISCLOSURE CATCH UP WITH DEVELOPMENTS? (2009), 
http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-
resources/publications/Climate%20Change%20Disclosure%202009.pdf; see also 
Gray, supra note 192. 
 221. See SELLERS ET AL, supra note 220, at 3. 
 222. See Posting of Kristy T. Harlan et al. to Climate Change Report, (Dec. 9, 
2009), http://www.climatelawreport.com/tags/investor-network-on-climate-ri/  
(discussing how the selective disclosure of material fact can trigger a violation of 
Regulation FD). 
 223. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURES IN SEC FILINGS 4 n.4 
(2009) [hereinafter DPW], available at http://www.davispolk.com/ (from main page, 
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However, without specific SEC guidance concerning the construction 
of these provisions, companies are likely to face a great deal of 
scrutiny as to the sufficiency of their disclosures.  Furthermore, the 
lack of specific guidance may create uncertainty concerning best 
practices for addressing the complexities of climate risk and ambigui-
ty regarding the scope of disclosure sufficient to meet certain 
obligations under federal securities law.  
D. Financial Statement Disclosure and Accounting Standards 
Pursuant to the Commission’s rules and staff guidance, registered 
companies apply Generally Accepted Accounting Principles standards 
and disclose certain liabilities in their financial statements.224  The 
following provides a brief overview of a few key accounting concepts 
and fair value rules that apply to environmental liabilities and may be 
applicable to climate risk disclosure.225 
1. FAS 5 and FIN 14 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (Accounting for Contin-
gencies) (FAS 5) provides the standard for disclosure of material-
contingent liabilities where it is reasonably possible that a liability has 
been incurred or that an asset has been impaired at the time of the 
financial statement.226  Where a material contingent liability is 
 
search “Environmental Disclosures in SEC Filings”; follow hyperlink “Section 1”).  
See also ASTM Work Item: ASTM WK21096, New Guide for Disclosures Related to 
Climate Change Exposures/Risks, http://www.astm.org/DATABASE.CART/
WORKITEMS/WK21096.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (showing that the 
committee is contemplating instructions consistent with good commercial practices 
for climate change related disclosure); AICPA Statement of Position 94-6, Disclosure 
of Certain Significant Risks and Uncertainties, § 10,640 (1994) [hereinafter SOP 94-
6] (providing standard setting bodies with practical methods to improve information 
disclosure and measurements of risks and uncertainties); AICPA Statement of 
Position 96-1, Environmental Remediation Estimates, § 10,680.02,  ¶ A.12 (1996) 
[hereinafter SOP 96-1]. 
 224. See Commission Guidance Regarding the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board’s Accounting Standards Codification, Sec. & Exch. Comm. Release Nos. 33-
9062A; 34-60519A; FR-80A, 74 Fed. Reg. 163 (Aug. 25, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 211, 231, 241, at 3), available at http://sec.gov/rules/interp/2009/33-9062a.pdf 
(explaining that the Commission’s rules and staff guidance make reference to U.S. 
GAAP for both the form and content of financial statements, and for disclosure 
outside of the financial statement, including Regulation S-K).   
 225. This list is in no way comprehensive and does not address disclosure 
potential under Form 20F for Disclosure Requirements on Foreign Private Issuer as 
discussed in DPW, supra note 223, at 16. 
 226. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, ¶ 
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reasonably possible but cannot be estimated, FAS 5 requires that the 
liability be disclosed in the footnotes of the financial statements.227  
FASB Interpretation 14, Reasonable Estimation of the Amount of a Loss 
(FIN 14), the interpretation of FAS 5, clarifies the method for the best 
estimate for an amount accrued as well as the estimated range for 
possible loss.228  The Ceres Petition refers to the provisions that trigger 
instances where companies should be accruing for climate change 
liability and disclosing their risk on their balance sheets.229  For 
example, accrual for climate change liability may be triggered in 
instances where the altered economic conditions from climate change 
may result in expenses exceeding income for some products asso-
ciated with high GHG-emitting assets.230 
2. FAS 143-FIN 47 
Under FAS 143 and the Interpretative Note FIN 47, a company is 
required to disclose material asset retirement obligations where the 
fair value can be estimated and is material.  These standards may be 
relevant to climate risk disclosure for those companies that may retire 
assets that are carbon intensive as part of a carbon reduction strate-
gy.231  However, FAS 143 is applied in instances where there is a legal 
obligation to retire the asset, so that it may resume normal operation.  
Some practitioners speculate about the scope of interpreting the 
standard where material remediation may be necessary before retiring 
the asset either in the course of normal or abnormal operations, 
 
8 (FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. OF THE FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND. 1975). 
 227. See Smith Transcript, supra note 205, at 10130. 
 228. See U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Summary by the Division of 
Corporation Finance of Significant Issues Addressed in the Review of the Periodic 
Reports of the Fortune 500 Companies, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/fortune500rep.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (directing companies to FIN 
14 for guidance on estimating amounts accrued and range for possible loss); see also 
U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Interpretation: Commission Guidance 
Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results 
of Operations, http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8350.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 
2010) (noting that these provisions are not exhaustive of the FASB rules applicable to 
accounting for environmental liabilities). 
 229. See Ceres Petition, supra note 2, at 15. 
 230. Id. at 15; see also Raymond R. Rose, Being Underway, Not in Delay, on Climate 
Change-Related Disclosure, 20 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 23, 23–28 (2008) (discussing the 
drawbacks of filing a SEC petition as a method for activism). 
 231. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 143: ACCOUNTING FOR ASSET 
RETIREMENT OBLIGATIONS, ¶ 3 (FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. OF THE FIN. 
ACCOUNTING FOUND. 2001).   
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which may trigger FAS 5.232  This analysis is admittedly an oversimplifi-
cation of the rules intended only to highlight the need for interpreta-
tion as it applies to climate risk. 
3. SAB 92 
In Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92 (SAB 92), the SEC provided 
enhanced guidance concerning claims for loss recovery where 
additional disclosure might be required under Regulation S-K to 
“enable a reader to understand” the environmental contingencies 
facing the registrant.233  For example the Commission distinguishes 
between gross liabilities and the expected insurance recoveries or 
third party indemnification claims that must be recorded in the 
balance sheets.  Under SAB 92, the registrant may be required to also 
include: (1) recurring costs associated with hazardous substances and 
pollution operations, (2) capital expenditures to limit or monitor of 
costs of pollutants, (3) mandatory expenditures to remediate 
previously contaminated sites, and (4) other infrequent or nonrecur-
ring or cleanup expenses that can be anticipated.234  The recom-
mended approach for measuring those liabilities would be based on 
considering the currently available facts, existing technology, and 
presently enacted laws and regulations that take into account the 
likely effects of inflation and other societal and economic factors.235 
4. ASTM International 
Beginning in 2008, the American Society for Testing and Mate-
rials International (ASTM) established Committee E50 on Environ-
mental Risk Management and Correction Action to provide guidance 
to companies for good commercial and customary practices for 
climate risk disclosure in audited and nonaudited financial state-
ments.236  The Guide for Disclosure Related to Climate 
 
 232. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, ¶ 
8 (FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. OF THE FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND. 1975).   
 233. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, 58 Fed. Reg. 32,843 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter SAB 92].  
 234. DPW, supra note 223, at 19–20; see also Rose, supra note 229; SAB 92, supra 
note 232. 
 235. See SAB 92, supra note 233, at 32, 844. 
 236. See ASTM Work Item: ASTM WK21096, New Guide for Disclosures Related to 
Climate Change Exposures/Risks, http://www.astm.org/WorkItems/WK21096.htm 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (showing a committee work item to create a guide that 
provides companies with a series of options or instructions consistent with good 
commercial and customary practice for climate change-related disclosures accompa-
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Change/Exposures/Risks is in a second round of balloting with final 
standards to become available in the near future.237  While the guide is 
intended for use on a voluntary basis, practitioners have noted that 
many ASTM standards may become mandatory after being adopted by 
regulatory agencies.238 
Ultimately, the Ceres petition and its subsequent supplements 
sought both interpretive guidance from the Commission under 
Accounting Standards and disclosure provisions under Regulation 
S-K.239  But a derivative benefit of requiring certain information for a 
disclosure is that the entity must devise adequate internal procedures 
for gathering and assessing information to comply with its fiduciary 
duties and its obligations under federal securities laws.240 
By comparison, the municipal bond market does not have to ad-
here to the accounting standards of the FASB, nor is it subject to the 
mandatory provisions outlined above.241 
IV. TENUOUS PARTICIPATION IN THE CLIMATE RISK DEBATE 
With the considerable amount of will focused upon the evalua-
tion, assessment and disclosure of climate risk in nearly every sector of 
the global economy, it is difficult to imagine that the $2.8 trillion 
municipal bond market has been left out in the cold.  While the 
energy sector may make up a relatively small percentage of the total 
tax-exempt bond market, energy projects are among the largest 
emitters of greenhouse gases and are by far the most costly on a 
project-by-project basis.242  Even for municipal issuer funding projects 
that are not carbon intensive, the framework for measuring, assessing 
 
nying audited and unaudited financial statements); Jonathan Berr, Assessing the 
Business Impact of Climate Change, ASTM INTERNATIONAL, Jan./Feb. 2009, 
http://www.astm.org/SNEWS/JF_2009/berr_jf09.html (stating that “[t]hese days, 
the business of doing business includes providing more information about green-
house gases, and a new task group in Committee E50 on Environmental Assessment, 
Risk Management and Corrective Action is developing guidelines on how to do it”).  
 237. Berr, supra note 236 (explaining that the first balloting recently took place in 
Miami).  
 238. See Lewis B. Jones, ASTM Issues Draft Standard on Climate Change Disclosures, 
ENVTL. DISCLOSURE COMM. NEWSL., Mar. 2009, at 5.  
 239. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(a) (2009).  
 240. Ceres Petition, supra note 2, at 9.  
 241. See Cox, supra note 24 (discussing Texas and Connecticut legislation that 
considered allowing state and local governments to avoid following the rules of the 
Government Accounting Standards Board which mandated uniformity in the 
accounting standards).  
 242. See Thompson Letter, supra note 134. 
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and disclosing the physical impacts of climate risk will become 
increasingly essential as issues of water management and scarcity 
influenced by climate change come to the forefront.243 
It has been predicted that the speculative nature of the regulato-
ry risks of climate change may undermine the payment of debt service 
obligations, leading to an increased likelihood of premature refinanc-
ing and disruptive debt restructuring.244  Even in the energy sector 
where climate risk will have and is having a direct and significant 
impact on the fiscal stability of operations, the reporting of these risks 
has been essentially voluntary and arguably so incomplete as to be 
misleading to investors.245  As the municipal bond market recovers 
from the financial crisis of 2008, lax disclosure obscures its many 
vulnerabilities, including declining tax and project revenues and the 
increased likelihood of defaults, many due to soured derivative 
transactions. Resisting participation in the climate risk disclosure 
debate, a discussion about enhanced disclosure generally, may offer a 
front row seat concerning the consequences of undisclosed risk and is 
contributions to a perfect storm that could impact market stability.    
A. An Example of Voluntary Climate Risk Disclosure 
Power generation entities, many of which operate coal-fired pow-
er plants, are among the principal contributors to carbon dioxide 
emissions and the most vulnerable to material environmental risks 
under carbon reduction regulations.246  Rural electric cooperatives are 
facilities organized as tax-exempt 501(c)(12) organizations that often 
operate carbon-intensive generation and transmission power facili-
ties.247  These entities will use a combination of financing arrange-
ments to fund their operations including the tax-exempt bond 
market.248  The following climate risk disclosure appeared in the 
 
 243. Ceres Petition, supra note 2, at 28. 
 244. Id. at 28–29. 
 245. See Ceres 10K Report, supra note 96, at 19 (comparing the disclosure levels 
on emissions and climate change for six coal companies where “one company had no 
disclosure, five had disclosure evaluated as poor or limited [and] [o]nly two 
companies disclosed GHG emissions data, a significant shortcoming in a sector facing 
regulatory risks because of its carbon dioxide emissions intensity”). 
 246. Id.  
 247. Section 501(c)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code provides an income tax 
exemption for rural electric cooperatives if at least 85 percent of the cooperative’s 
income consists of amounts collected from members for the sole purpose of meeting 
losses and expenses of providing service to its members.  See Rev. Rul. 72-36, 1972-1 
C.B. 151.  
 248. See  Andrew, supra note 133, at 4–9 (summarizing financial arrangements of 
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Spring 2009 official statement of an electric cooperative’s multi-
million dollar tax-exempt bond offering to finance ongoing construc-
tion of a new coal fired power plant.   
[Entity] is unable to predict whether the EPA will impose 
regulations of GHG, and if so, what their form or effect 
would be. [Entity] is also unable to predict whether [sic] the 
federal bill proposed to regulate GHG will become law or 
what their final form or effect would be. At this time, there 
does not appear to be a consensus as to what the level of 
future regulation of emissions will be, or the costs associated 
with that regulation. However, any such costs would likely 
impact the [project] and the electric market, and could be 
material to the Participants.249 
 Even with interpretive guidance from the Commission, the 
question of whether or not this kind of disclosure is adequate for 
purposes of federal securities law remains unclear.  The disclosure 
focuses on predicting outcomes instead of addressing internal efforts 
to measure climate risk and ultimately does not leave the investor 
better informed about its climate risk strategy.250  It is common for the 
quality of disclosure to improve as an emerging concept is tested in 
the courts and by the regulatory initiatives.251  However, it begs the 
question: at what point does an issuer trigger the antifraud provisions 
where an investor is no better informed about the cooperative’s risk 
exposure for having read the disclosure?   
The Commission’s 1994 Interpretive Guidance on the Antifraud 
Provisions for municipal securities provides that “[t]he adequacy of 
disclosure provided in municipal security offering materials is tested 
against an objective standard: an omitted fact is material if there is a 
substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted 
fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the 
reasonable (investor).”252  Ultimately, “there must be a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of omitted fact would significantly alter 
the ‘total mix’ of information available.”253  To date, the Commission 
remains silent as to the extent to which the omission of certain 
 
rural utility services). 
 249. For purposes of this article, the electric cooperative at issue will remain 
unnamed. 
 250. See Smith Transcript, supra note 204 (discussing the objectives of adequate 
disclosure).  
 251. New World Risk, supra note 109. 
 252. 1994 Release, supra note 59, at 12740.  
 253. 1994 Release, supra note 59, at 12740 n.30 (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).  
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climate risks are in fact significant in the deliberations of the reasona-
ble investor.  However, New York Attorney General Cuomo’s regulato-
ry efforts may create an inference of materiality and may be worth 
considering in assessing the adequacy of climate risk disclosure.254 
The agreements reached between the New York Attorney Gener-
al and each of the subpoenaed power companies may provide 
guidance for determining whether or not climate risk disclosure has 
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable investors.  While 
the agreements were binding only on each of the publicly traded 
companies, the terms of the settlement could provide a framework for 
prioritizing volumes of complex financial and nonfinancial informa-
tion concerning the present and potential impacts of climate risk.  
Furthermore, the settlement terms could help establish a reasonable 
standard for inferring materiality where the parameters were crafted 
by regulators who share the Commission’s interest in protecting the 
investors from fraud.  Even though the issuer at question is not a 
publicly traded company, the power companies bound by these 
settlements are in many ways industry peers of the issuer. 
In applying the settlement criteria, it is apparent that the issuer’s 
climate risk analysis differs substantially from the analysis described in 
the settlement.  First, the issuer’s disclosure does not include a 
description of an analysis of the financial risks from the present and 
probable regulations of greenhouse gas emissions.255  Nor does it 
include any description of implemented methods, procedures or 
committees to evaluate the current and impending regulations of its 
carbon intensive activities.256  Second, the disclosure makes no 
mention of any analysis of financial risk from litigation involving the 
company, the outcome of which will likely have a material financial 
effect on the company, including any climate change-related decisions 
issued by any court in any jurisdiction in which the company oper-
ates.257  Third, the disclosure makes no mention of the physical 
impacts of climate change, nor does it provide a method for measur-
ing the material financial impact that climate change may have on the 
 
 254. See, e.g., AES Settlement, supra note 117, ¶ E; Dynegy Settlement, supra note 
118, ¶ E. 
 255. See AES Settlement, supra note 117, at ¶¶ 1(a)(1)–(2); Dynegy Settlement, 
supra note 118, at ¶¶ 1(a)(1)–(2).  
 256. See AES Settlement, supra note 117, at ¶¶ 1(a)(1)–(2); Dynegy Settlement, 
supra note 118, at ¶¶ 1(a)(1)–(2).  
 257. See AES Settlement, supra note 117, at ¶ 1(b); Dynegy Settlement, supra note 
118, at ¶ 1(b). 
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company’s operations.258  Lastly, the official statement lacks a 
description of a strategic analysis of climate change risk or emissions 
management.259  Ultimately, the disclosure is an example of the kind 
of information that fills a void by acknowledging that there is a need 
for some kind of climate risk disclosure, but the execution falls short 
of informing investors.260 
B. Legacy of Exemption 
At the end of 2009, as the Senate Banking Committee contem-
plated sweeping regulatory reform, it sidestepped the question of 
whether or not Congress would finally repeal the Tower Amendments 
and empower the Commission to directly regulate issuers.261  Instead, 
by some accounts, the Senate intends to commission the Government 
Accountability Office to submit a report within one year of enactment, 
comparing municipal and bond disclosure requirements and 
evaluating the costs and benefits to issuers.262  It is likely that Congress 
will also require the Commission to conduct a study addressing the 
importance of the Government Accounting Standards Board, its 
funding and recommended legislative action.263  The delay is not a 
surprising turn of events and is consistent with the history of aggres-
sive lobbying to oppose any form of direct issuer regulations.264  
 
 258. See AES Settlement, supra note 117, at ¶ 1(c); Dynegy Settlement, supra note 
118, at ¶ 1(c). 
 259. AES Settlement, supra note 117, at ¶ 1(d); Dynegy Settlement, supra note 
118, at ¶ 1(d).  
 260. New World Risk, supra note 109; see also 1994 Release, supra note 59 (discuss-
ing Commission’s suspicions that Issuers may avoid disclosure to prevent  triggering 
the antifraud provisions as a reason why municipal issuers resist developing a routine 
of ongoing disclosure to the investing market). 
 261. Andrew Ackerman, Regulatory Reform Bill Faces Dissent, BOND BUYER, Nov. 24, 
2009, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/118_226/reform-bill-objection-1004219-
1.html  (explaining that “[t]he Senate bill sidesteps some of the more controversial 
calls for reform in the municipal market, such as the repeal of the so-called Tower 
Amendment, which was added to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and 
restricts the MSRB and SEC from collecting offering documents prior to bond 
sales”); see also Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. (2009) (as passed by House, 223–202, Dec. 11, 2009) (historical financial 
regulatory bill).  
 262. Ackerman, supra note 261. 
 263. Id.  
 264. Interview with Michael McCarthy, Chairman of the Bond Mkt. Found, and 
Christopher Taylor, Exec. Dir. of the Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd., ConnectLive.Com, 
Fireside Chat: Municipal Securities (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Historical Soc’y Apr. 20, 
2004) (discussing the strong opposition that has cooled legislative efforts to directly 
regulate issuers), http://www.connectlive.com/events/sechistorical/420%20
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Unfortunately, the delay will continue to frustrate the Commission’s 
efforts to improve the access, quality, and level of information in 
order to create parity among corporate securities and municipal 
securities investors.265  In the opinion of Commissioners and academ-
ics alike, the Commission has nearly, if not already, exceeded its 
authority.266  As a result, efforts to regulate the market will continue to 
focus on municipal dealers. 
The Commission is currently contemplating proposed amend-
ments to rule 15c2-12 under the Exchange Act.  These provisions 
would  amend certain requirements regarding the information that a 
broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer acting as an underwriter 
in a primary offering must reasonably determine that an issuer or 
underwriter has undertaken to support the veracity of the offering.267  
The proposed amendments also address the municipal dealer’s 
determination that an issuer has agreed to provide material event 
information within ten days and amendments to the list of events for 
which notice is required.268  Additionally, the MSRB filed a rule 
proposal with the Commission that would permit issuers and their 
designated agents to make certain voluntary submissions to EMMA.269 
Finalizing these rules will be a substantial step forward in provid-
ing guidance to municipal bond participants by further defining 
material information and defining the reasonable period of time 
within which material information must be made available to market 
participants for continuing disclosure documents in the secondary 
market.  The amendments continue past practices of regulating the 
municipal dealers in order to improve the municipal marketplace by 
encouraging issuers to voluntarily provide information.270  However, 
without any real enforcement measures, the bond market remains at a 
marked disadvantage.  
V. CONCLUSION: CLIMATE DEBATE AS REGULATORY CANARY 
In some ways, the climate change debate could be construed as a 
 
Municipal%20Securities%20Transcript.htm.  
 265. Schapiro, supra note 92. 
 266. Schapiro, supra note 92. 
 267. Proposed Rules, supra note 71, at 12.  
 268. Id. at 12–13.  See also Walter Speech, supra note 7, pt. III. 
 269. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Additional Voluntary 
Submissions by Issuers to the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access System 
(EMMA®), Exchange Act Release No. 34-6015, 74 Fed. Reg. 36,294, 36,295 (July 22, 
2009).  
 270. Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 765.  
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test of how close municipal bond disclosure documents can come to 
reaching a level of parity with corporate securities disclosure.  
Achieving substantive parity would meet an elusive goal long-
championed by past and present Commissioners.271  More important-
ly, parity would create patterns and practices for disclosure that would 
foster quality and consistency of information available to all investors.  
With the creation of EMMA, the Commission now has a repository for 
material information that municipal bond investors can access free of 
charge.272  Proposed amendments to rule 15c2-12 seek to enhance the 
timing of information, expand the definition of material events that 
must be disclosed, and offer guidelines to enhance the underlying 
quality of information available.273  And even with the continuation of 
the Tower Amendments limiting the authority of the Commission, 
there is a growing trend in the market to place greater reliance on 
disclosure documents, and less emphasis on credit ratings, credit 
enhancements, and bond insurance to make determinations about 
the soundness of a municipal bond as an investment.274  All signs point 
toward a disclosure regime for the municipal bond market that may 
develop a substantive sophistication worthy of the $2.8 trillion dollar 
space it occupies in the U.S. capital markets.  
An issuer’s assessment and methods for addressing its exposure 
to the financial risks of climate change should be a reasonably similar 
process for both corporate and municipal issuers in the energy sector.  
Because Municipal securities are debt, not equity, instruments, there 
are no shareholders and as a result no coalition or process for 
influencing the issuer’s approach to managing and disclosing climate 
risk as material information.  The question then remains whether the 
hundreds of corporate shareholder resolutions demanding climate 
change disclosure from the largest carbon emitters sufficiently 
illustrate that it is reasonably likely that the desires of corporate 
 
 271. See, e.g., Walter Speech, supra note 7 (noting past Commissioners’ work); see 
also Schapiro, supra note 92; Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Statement at Open Meeting on Municipal Securities Disclosure (July 30, 2008), 
http://www.sec. gov/news/speech/2008/spch073008cc_msrb.htm. 
 272. U.S. Sec. & Exc. Comm. Amendment to Municipal Securities Disclosure 
(Dec. 5, 2008) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 273. Proposed Rules, supra note 71.  
 274. See, e.g., Carl Dincesen, Municipal Bonds: Time for a Closer Look, SEEKING ALPHA, 
Mar. 26, 2009, http://seekingalpha.com/article/ 127953-municipal-bonds-time-for-a-
closer-look (recommending that investors should not buy or sell without a full 
understanding of the bond’s credit risk where the municipal market has been willing 
to accept weaker forms of pledge revenue and bond covenants, greater complexity, 
unfounded contract liabilities and circumnavigation of debt limits). 
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investors would be substantially similar to the desires of municipal 
bond investors.  
An issuer’s exposure to financial risk continues to drive discus-
sions about the factors impacting a municipal bond’s credit risk and 
likelihood of default.  Under a carbon constrained regime, the 
financial risks of carbon regulation can and will have a significant 
impact on the bottom line of large carbon emitters that utilize the tax-
exempt bond market.275  Impending regulations addressing each stage 
in the lifecycle of a coal-fired power plant will have substantial 
financial impacts on its operations.  A risk assessment will likely 
include procedures to answer questions concerning the efforts to 
minimize the impact of CO2 regulations and whether those initiatives 
will include offsets.  Other considerations may include the formation 
of committees to assess implications of a cap-and-trade regime, impact 
from other regions, reactions to litigation, the impact of carbon credit 
regulations, and regulations governing coal combustion residuals, also 
known as coal ash, containing arsenic and heavy metals.276  As 
additional information emerges concerning the short- and long-term 
financial impacts of operating carbon-intensive energy projects, it will 
become increasingly clear that those well-positioned to mitigate those 
risks will be well-positioned to issue bonds that are less likely to 
default.277 
In addition to the anticipated financial impacts of climate risks, 
the municipal bond market continues to withstand pressure from the 
 
 275. Ceres Petition, supra note 2.   
 276. See Testimony of Ken Ladwig, Sr. Research Mgr., Electric Power Research 
Inst., before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Energy and 
Environment (Dec. 10, 2009) (discussing the possibility of coal ash addressed as a 
hazardous waste and the impact the regulation will have on owners and operators of 
coal fired power plants), http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20091210/
ladwig_testimony.pdf. 
 277. See The Climate Institute, Topics/Core Issues: Water,  
http://www.climate.org/topics/water.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (including an 
analysis of the impact of climate change on water decreased freshwater availability 
caused by disruption of the hydrological cycle and changes in precipitation); see 
generally Jason Morrison et. al, Water Scarcity and Climate Change: Growing Risk for 
Business and Investors (Ceres 2009), http://www.pacinst.org/reports/business_ 
water_climate/full_report.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (regarding the growing risks 
for businesses and investors due to water scarcity and climate change); see also Press 
Release, World Resources Institute, General Electric and Goldman Sachs Launch 
Initiative to Measure Water Risks and Opportunities (Dec. 7, 2009), 
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/services/advising/environmental-markets/center-
for-em/water-index.pdf (includes an analysis of the impact of climate change on 
decreased freshwater availability caused by disruption of the hydrological cycle and 
changes in precipitation). 
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financial crisis of the last several years.  Some experts speculate that 
many municipal bond issuers are likely to face defaults and possibly 
bankruptcies where the recession has sapped tax receipts with 
revenues falling for four consecutive quarters.278  The anticipated 
cracks in the municipal bond market caused by unfundable state 
deficits, growing gaps between revenue and spending, and increasing 
pressures to cover investment losses on higher pension obligations 
reveal frailties that will continue to undermine the myth that munici-
pal bonds don’t default.279 
Even for municipal issuers that do not fund carbon intensive 
projects, the recent crisis in the financial markets has demonstrated 
the interconnectedness of market participants and how weaknesses in 
one area of the market can infect other areas.  The lack of bond 
insurers available to guarantee bond offerings now is part of the 
legacy and continuing impact of the subprime crisis of mid-2008.  
Once guarantors of municipal bonds were downgraded and auctions 
for securities began to fail, interest rates on municipal securities 
converted to high default rates that have left struggling communities 
with billions of dollars in debt.280  While the energy sector occupies a 
small portion of the tax-exempt funding program, its projects are the 
most cost-intensive with total expenditures ranging as high as $6 
billion.281  The speculative costs associated with the construction of 
coal-fired power plants may lead to disruptive debt restructuring and 
premature refinancing over the life of the bonds which could send a 
ripple effect throughout the market.282 
Access to all sources of material information concerning an issu-
er’s exposure to material financial risk is more important now than 
ever before.  As these financial realities begin to surface in the market, 
 
 278. See Nicole Bullock, Warning on U.S. Muni Market Threat, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 
1, 2009, http://www.rockinst.org/newsroom/news_stories/2009/2009-12-01-
Financial_Times.pdf. 
 279. Frederick J. Sheehan, Dark Vision: The Coming Collapse of the Municipal Bond 
Market, WELLING@WEEDEN REPRINTS Vol. 11, Issue 18 (Sept. 29, 2009), http://content
.municipalbonds.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11 /1118_gp_sheehan_reprint.pdf. 
 280. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Firm Acted as Tutor as it Sold Risky Deals to Towns, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 09, 2009, at A1 (discussing the escalated debt on Lewisburg, Tennessee 
bonds); see also Burnsed, supra note 23 (discussing the billion dollar bond default 
Jefferson County).    
 281. David Schlissel & Lucy Johnston, The Financial Risks to Old Dominion Electric 
Cooperative’s Consumer Members of Building and Operating the Proposed Cypress Creek Power 
Station, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMIES, INC., Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.southern
environment.org/uploads/fck/file/hampton%20roads%20coal%20plant/synapse 
%20economic%20report%20final%2004-22-09.pdf.  
 282. Thompson Letter, supra note 134. 
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issuer discussions about what are perceived as the prohibitive costs of 
enhanced disclosure are likely to pale in comparison to the multi-
billion dollar bond defaults that are occurring as a result of escalating 
interest rates on derivative transactions.283 
 
 
 283.  Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 762 (discussing the necessary costs of disclosure, 
and whether specific disclosure is overkill, and not useful); see also Statement of the 
Commission Regarding Disclosure Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and 
Others, 59 Fed. Reg. 12748 (March 17,1994) (discussing testimony from NABL, 
stating that if issuers choose to undertake the financial benefits of these sophisticated 
and complicated transactions, they can assume the financial costs of providing 
information). 
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